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The Fourth Amendment: Internal Revenue
Code or Body of Principles?
Stephen A. Saltzburg*
Introduction
It is difficult to be certain when the Supreme Court made the body of
Fourth Amendment law so complicated, inconsistent, and confusing that
neither police nor citizens can be sure they understand the reach of and
limits on law enforcement action. Although there were inconsistent
decisions before the Supreme Court decided Mapp v. Ohio1 in 1961, Mapp
represented a watershed moment for the Court and may have had as great
an impact on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as any case before or since.
Prior to that decision the Court focused its attention on federal law
enforcement and devoted less of its docket to criminal procedure cases than
it does today.2 Once it decided Mapp and was called upon to review state
cases developing throughout the country, the Court was forced to deal with
the myriad of state law enforcement issues that inevitably arise when law
enforcement officers deal with a range of offenses as minor as traffic
violations and as major as homicide. Mapp also meant that when the Court
upheld a Fourth Amendment claim and found that the police violated the
Constitution, evidence would to some extent3 become unavailable. Thus,
*

Wallace and Beverley Woodbury University Professor of Law, The George
Washington University Law School; A.B., 1967, Dickinson College; J.D., 1970, University
of Pennsylvania.
1 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (creating an exclusionary rule making
inadmissible in state courts all evidence obtained by unconstitutional searches and seizures).
Although the Court had held years earlier in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949), that
the substance of the Fourth Amendment (i.e., the security of one’s privacy against arbitrary
intrusion by the police) was part of due process protected by the Fourteenth Amendment,
the absence of an exclusionary rule meant that the Court did not have to worry that its
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment would result in a federally mandated loss of
evidence in state cases, which constituted the vast bulk of criminal cases in the United
States.
2 For the first one hundred years, the Fourth Amendment was rarely litigated in the
Supreme Court, which is not surprising given that federal criminal jurisdiction was limited.
NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 106 (1937).
3 The Court has created numerous exceptions to or limitations on the exclusionary
rule. These make it impossible to know exactly what the result of suppression of evidence
will be. For example, not all suspects have “standing” to complain about Fourth
Amendment violations. See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133–34 (1978) (holding
that Fourth Amendment rights are personal, and only one whose rights are violated can
complain). Another example is the “independent source doctrine.” See, e.g., Murray v.
United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537 (1988) (holding that evidence obtained unlawfully will not
be excluded if later obtained by independent legitimate means). The exclusionary rule, with
all of its limitations, is itself an example of how the Fourth Amendment resembles an
intricate code.
August 2006 Vol. 74 No. 5/6
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the Court knew that every Fourth Amendment rule would set a standard for
federal4 and state law enforcement officers and thereby control law
enforcement, but could also exact a price from society by letting a
defendant who was in fact guilty, possibly of a serious crime, and others
who were similarly situated go free. It would hardly be surprising,
therefore, for the Court to feel torn as it rendered Fourth Amendment
decisions, wanting to make Fourth Amendment protections meaningful but
not wanting guilty defendants to go free as a result of law enforcement
errors.
Whether it was this tension that led the Court to decide cases in an
erratic way only the Justices can know, and even they might not be certain
as to why particular rules or applications of rules were approved. Whatever
the reason, there can be no doubt that for much of the forty-five years since
the Mapp decision, the Court has made the meaning of the relatively few
words that constitute the Fourth Amendment extremely complicated. The
Court has created so many rules and subrules that the total body of Fourth
Amendment law has begun to take on the shape of an Internal Revenue
Code (a hodgepodge of rules enacted by ever-shifting coalitions of decision
makers) rather than a body of coherent principles (of the type often
associated with judicial decisions and reasoning).5
The Court itself has noticed the complexity of its work. From time to
time, it has adopted “bright line” rules in an effort to provide some clarity
amidst a jumble of confusion.6 As it turns out, these bright line rules
generally are announcements of an expanded police power that rests on
judicial fiat rather than reason. The Court’s bright line rules run in one
direction: they favor the police and disfavor claims of individual rights.
But the problem with the bright-line-rule cases is not that they are
unidirectional; the problem is that bright line rules are generally
unprincipled and, for that reason, tend in the long run to make Fourth
4 An exclusionary rule governed federal law enforcement officers beginning with
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914).
5 A 2002 analysis of Supreme Court cases by the Congressional Research Service of
the Library of Congress concluded that “[e]xceptions to the warrant requirement are no
longer evaluated solely by the justifications for the exception, e.g., exigent circumstances,
and the scope of the search is no longer tied to and limited by the justification for the
exception.” CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LIBRARY OF CONG., THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA—ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION: ANALYSIS OF CASES DECIDED BY THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES TO JUNE 28, 2002, S. DOC NO. 108-17, at 1291
(2004).
6 See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 462–63 (1981) (establishing a “bright
line” rule permitting the search of the passenger compartment of a car incident to arrest).
The Court maintains that it does not prefer bright line rules. See, e.g., Ohio v. Robinette,
519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996) (“[W]e have consistently eschewed bright-line rules, instead
emphasizing the fact-specific nature of the reasonableness inquiry.”). The discussion that
follows will demonstrate, however, that the Court often adopts arbitrary lines in an effort to
provide guidance to law enforcement officers.
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Amendment doctrine arbitrary, inconsistent, and confusing.
The alternative to bright line rules is a body of principles that capture
the essence of the Fourth Amendment. It is amazing that, after more than
two hundred years of experience with the Fourth Amendment, more than
ninety years with an exclusionary rule covering federal cases, and almost a
half century with an exclusionary rule covering all cases, the Supreme
Court has articulated only one fundamental Fourth Amendment principle—
i.e., warrantless searches generally are per se unreasonable7—that is subject
to so many exceptions and applies so relatively infrequently that it is a
principle honored more in the breach than in the observance.8
In this article, I offer examples of the unsatisfactory present state of the
law. I also suggest alternatives to the Court’s holdings, seek to
demonstrate why principled rules provide clearer guidance to law
enforcement and citizens than arbitrary “bright line” rules, and explain how
principled rules can enable law enforcement to do its work effectively
while being true to basic Fourth Amendment values.
There are many examples that could be used to support the argument I
make, and I have chosen those that make the case clearly and powerfully. I
begin with the automobile exception to the warrant requirement of the
Fourth Amendment, explain its history and the paucity of support upon
which the Court relied in creating the exception, show how it is
unprincipled and inconsistent with other cases the Court has decided, and
demonstrate that the exception has led the Court to decide a number of
cases in an arbitrary and inconsistent way. The sheer length of the
discussion of the automobile exception cases is testament to the complexity
and confusion it has generated. Although this is not an article about
automobiles, after discussion of the automobile exception, I turn to the
search-incident-to-arrest doctrine and, in part, focus on the special rules the
Court created when it applied the doctrine to searches of persons arrested in
7 The Court has said that “searches conducted outside the judicial process, without
prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
8 Justice Scalia made this point in his concurring opinion in California v. Acevedo,
500 U.S. 565 (1991):
Even before today’s decision, the “warrant requirement” had become so riddled
with exceptions that it was basically unrecognizable. In 1985, one commentator
cataloged nearly 20 such exceptions, including “searches incident to arrest . . .
automobile searches . . . border searches . . . administrative searches of regulated
businesses . . . exigent circumstances . . . search[es] incident to nonarrest when
there is probable cause to arrest . . . boat boarding for document checks . . . welfare
searches . . . inventory searches . . . airport searches . . . school search[es] . . . .”
Since then, we have added at least two more [exceptions, including] searches of
mobile homes [and] searches of offices of government employees.
Id. at 582–83 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (first two alterations in original)
(citations omitted).
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or near cars. The discussion of the doctrine illustrates the difference
between adopting a principled approach, which the Court did at one time,
and abandoning such an approach in favor of arbitrary, inconsistent, “bright
line” rules.
After demonstrating the problems associated with the Court’s arbitrary
and inconsistent decisions, I identify some basic principles that should
guide the Court in interpreting the Fourth Amendment. First, I explain the
importance of determining whether law enforcement officials are engaging
in consensual or nonconsensual conduct. Second, I discuss seizures and
Terry stops and offer suggestions on adopting principles that would make it
easier for both law enforcement officers and citizens to know when a
seizure occurs. In this section, I argue that it makes more sense to focus on
police conduct rather than to require police to intuit what reasonable
individuals think about police conduct. A focus on police conduct leads to
the conclusion that a number of Supreme Court decisions provide less
Fourth Amendment protection than they should provide. The discussion of
seizures covers seizures of both individuals and property.
Third, I address what I regard as one of the most important, and sure to
be one of the most controversial, suggestions for reform of Fourth
Amendment law. I do this in a discussion of arrests, where I claim that the
Court has failed to adequately consider the unreasonableness of many
arrests for minor offenses. I discuss the reasons why law enforcement
officers arrest suspects, offer a principled approach to limit the number of
future arrests, and suggest an improvement on the Court’s approach to
warrants as a prerequisite to arrest.
Fourth, I conclude with three straightforward suggestions for making
the law of searches clearer and more principled. One deals with search
incident to arrest. The other two address searches of property and the
requirement of a warrant. The three suggestions would give the Warrant
Clause of the Fourth Amendment the deference the Court claims it
deserves, provide better guidance for law enforcement officers, and replace
arbitrary rules with principled ones.
This article makes no claim that the Rehnquist Court was the sole or
even the principal cause of Fourth Amendment law’s arbitrariness and
complexity. The problems with Fourth Amendment doctrine are eighty
years old, have grown over time, and have largely been ignored by both the
predecessors to the Rehnquist Court and the Rehnquist Court itself. Fourth
Amendment law was complex, inconsistent, and confusing before Chief
Justice Rehnquist led the Court.9 But the Rehnquist Court missed

9

Some of the confusion was generated while Chief Justice Rehnquist was an
Associate Justice. Chief Justice Rehnquist was part of the Court’s decision making for three
quarters of the post-Mapp period, as Associate Justice from 1972 to1985, and thereafter as
Chief Justice.
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opportunities to correct the problems that it inherited and even exacerbated
some of them as it continued down the path of the Warren and Burger
Courts and their predecessors. With the Roberts Court now underway, the
problems will continue unless the Court is willing to take a fresh look at the
complex Internal Revenue–type law it has created.
I.

The Automobile Exception to the Fourth Amendment

Given that Americans love their cars, love to drive, and use their cars
for a variety of tasks,10 it is surprising how the Supreme Court has dealt
with automobiles in Fourth Amendment cases. It is fair to say that there is
more bad law involving the automobile than any other single item, with the
possible exception of narcotics.11
A.

Carroll v. United States

The Court’s first major automobile case was Carroll v. United States.12
Federal prohibition agents stopped a car with two occupants driving
westward on a highway between Detroit and Grand Rapids.13 The agents
had unexpectedly encountered the suspects and suspected that they were
carrying illegal liquor.14 After stopping the car, they searched it.15 Chief
Justice Taft’s opinion for the Court laid out the legislative history of the
federal prohibition statute authorizing the search and seizure of the vehicle,
which read as follows:
“When the commissioner, his assistants, inspectors, or any officer
of the law shall discover any person in the act of transporting in
violation of the law, intoxicating liquors in any wagon, buggy,
automobile, water or air craft, or other vehicle, it shall be his duty
to seize any and all intoxicating liquors found therein being
transported contrary to law. Whenever intoxicating liquors
transported or possessed illegally shall be seized by an officer he
shall take possession of the vehicle and team or automobile, boat,
air or water craft, or any other conveyance, and shall arrest any
person in charge thereof.”16
10 Former Virginia Attorney General Mary Sue Terry came from a Virginia town that
was so small that, as she so aptly put it, “‘[O]ur high school taught sex education and driver
ed in the same car.’” Patricia Edmonds, Walking Fine Line in Feud, USA TODAY, June 21,
1991, at 2A.
11 See generally Stephen A. Saltzburg, Another Victim of Illegal Narcotics: The
Fourth Amendment (as Illustrated by the Open Fields Doctrine), 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 1
(1986).
12 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
13 Id. at 135.
14 Id. at 135–36.
15 Id. at 136.
16 Id. at 144 (quoting National Prohibition Act § 26, 41 Stat. 305, 315–16 (1919)).
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The statute required the federal officers to seize any intoxicating
liquors found in a vehicle and to take possession of the vehicle itself.17
Although the statute did not specifically address searches of the vehicle, it
is fair to assume that even if officials came upon illegal liquor in plain
view, they would want to search the vehicle to assure that they seized all of
the liquor concealed therein. Since they were authorized to seize the
vehicle because it contained contraband, any search would have been of a
vehicle in which the government had a possessory right.18 The Court
claimed to be relying on early statutes that authorized warrantless searches.
It quoted from section 24 of the Act of 1789, which provided:
“That every collector, naval officer and surveyor, or other person
specially appointed by either of them for that purpose, shall have
full power and authority, to enter any ship or vessel, in which they
shall have reason to suspect any goods, wares or merchandise
subject to duty shall be concealed; and therein to search for, seize,
and secure any such goods, wares or merchandise; and if they
shall have cause to suspect a concealment thereof, in any
particular dwelling house, store, building, or other place, they or
either of them shall, upon application on oath or affirmation to any
justice of the peace, be entitled to a warrant to enter such house,
store, or other place (in the day time only) and there to search for
such goods . . . .”19

The Court in Carroll noted that the First Judiciary Act and other early federal statutes
empowered officers to board and search vessels when they had reason to suspect the vessels
were concealing items subject to duty. Id. at 150–51. The Court explained that there was
a difference made as to the necessity for a search warrant between goods subject to
forfeiture, when concealed in a dwelling house or similar place, and like goods in
course of transportation and concealed in a movable vessel where they readily
could be put out of reach of a search warrant.
Id. at 151. None of the statutes cited by the Court dealt with movable property or forms of
transport other than vessels.
17 National Prohibition Act § 26, 41 Stat. 305, 315–16 (1919).
18 The government also claimed a possessory right to the liquor. Title II, section 25 of
the National Prohibition Act was enacted to enforce the Eighteenth Amendment. The
statute made it unlawful to have or possess any liquor and provided that no property rights
existed in such liquor. Id. § 25. The statute restricted searches of homes even with warrants
but permitted warrants to issue to search places of business:
No search warrant shall issue to search any private dwelling occupied as such
unless it is being used for the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquor, or unless it is in
part used for some business purpose such as a store, shop, saloon, restaurant, hotel,
or boarding house. The term ‘private dwelling’ shall be construed to include the
room or rooms used and occupied not transiently but solely as a residence in an
apartment house, hotel, or boarding house.
Id. Upon conviction of the person from whom the liquor was seized, the liquor was to
be destroyed and the property (e.g., a car) was to be sold with the proceeds going to the
government. Id. §§ 25–26.
19 Carroll, 267 U.S. at 150–51 (quoting Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 24, 1 Stat. 29,
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The Court further noted that three subsequent acts passed shortly after the
Act of 1789 contained similar provisions.20 It is clear, however, that each
of the statutes cited permitted only warrantless searches of ships and
vessels and required warrants for searches of any “other place.”21 A search
of a coach, saddlebags, or other property that was mobile would be a search
for things in various “other places,” and would have required a warrant.
The Court ignored the precise language of the statutes in its conclusion:
We have made a somewhat extended reference to these statutes
to show that the guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches
and seizures by the Fourth Amendment has been construed,
practically since the beginning of the Government, as recognizing
a necessary difference between a search of a store, dwelling house
or other structure[22] in respect of which a proper official warrant
readily may be obtained, and a search of a ship, motor boat,
wagon or automobile, for contraband goods,[23] where it is not
practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must
be sought.24
Furthermore, the Court found that legislative history of the federal

43).
20 Id. at 151. The three statutes mentioned by the Court are as follows: Act of Aug. 4,
1790, ch. 35, §§ 48–51, 1 Stat. 145, 170; Act of Feb. 18, 1793, ch. 8, § 27, 1 Stat. 305, 315;
Act of Mar. 2, 1799, ch. 22, §§ 68–71, 1 Stat. 627, 677–78.
21 See Act of Aug. 4, 1790 § 48; Act of Feb. 18, 1793 § 27; Act of Mar. 2, 1799 § 68.
22 The Court substituted the word “structure” for the word “place” in the statutes.
This makes a big difference. See, e.g., Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 24, 1 Stat. 29, 43.
23 The Court made things somewhat easier for itself by suggesting that from the early
days of the Republic, movable vehicles could be searched without a warrant. In fact, there
were no motor boats or automobiles, and no early statute addressed them. Ships were a
special case because it was almost impossible to envision magistrates being available when
agents stopped a ship on the water. What about wagons? They existed in 1791 and were
capable of carrying all kinds of private property. Were they always subject to search
without warrants? What about a person riding a horse? Was anyone who was in motion
subject to search without warrants? The Court suggested that the statutes authorized such
searches, but quoted language that only addressed vessels.
Even though the language of the early statutes required a warrant to search for
items in any place except in ships and vessels, in later decisions the Court simply cited its
Carroll version of the statutes without looking back to their actual language. See, e.g.,
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 805–06 (1982).
It is clear that prior to the adoption of the Fourth Amendment, the Framers of the
Constitution were concerned about searches of “boxes chests & trunks” as well as homes.
LEONARD W. LEVY, SEASONED JUDGMENTS: THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, RIGHTS, AND
HISTORY 160 (1995) (quotation omitted). Were they only concerned about these items when
contained in houses? There is evidence that the Framers were concerned about searches of
“possessions” and “places” as well as searches of homes. LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL
INTENT AND THE FRAMERS’ CONSTITUTION 237 (1988) (citation omitted).
24 Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153.
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prohibition statute indicated that Congress intended to authorize
warrantless searches for automobiles and other road vehicles.25 It is
questionable whether this conclusion is correct. The Court demonstrated
that Congress ultimately enacted a law that made it a misdemeanor for any
officer seeking to enforce prohibition “without a search warrant [to]
maliciously and without reasonable cause search any other building or
property . . . .”26 The Court reasoned that this meant that officers were free
to search automobiles and other property other than homes without
warrants.27 This may be a stretch. Congress’s decision to make it a crime
to search without a warrant only when the officer acted maliciously and
without reasonable cause did not necessarily mean that Congress thought
all warrantless activity was constitutional. Congress might have wanted to
criminalize the worst warrantless conduct and leave ordinary warrantless
conduct to the courts to enforce through the exclusionary rule. The House
Report expressed a desire to permit warrantless searches of automobiles,28
in contravention of the Senate’s proposed statute. The Conference Report
adopted the language quoted above without explanation.29
Of course, there was no Terry v. Ohio30 at the time Carroll was
decided, and neither Congress nor the Court had occasion to consider
whether it was reasonable to search a vehicle without a warrant if it were
possible instead to seize the vehicle while a warrant was obtained. The
Carroll Court simply never addressed whether a ship, automobile, or other
transportation vehicle is so mobile as to make it “not practicable to secure a
warrant” if law enforcement officers have the power and ability to seize it
while a warrant is sought.
It also should be noted that the Court’s emphasis was on contraband,
which no party had a right to possess. At the time, the government could
not search for “mere evidence,” with or without a warrant.31 This greatly
limited the government’s ability to search.
One of the overlooked parts of Carroll is this phrase: “In cases where
the securing of a warrant is reasonably practicable, it must be used . . . .”32
25

Id. at 147.
Act Supplemental to the National Prohibition Act § 6, 42 Stat. 222, 223–24 (1921).
27 Carroll, 267 U.S. at 147.
28 See H.R. REP. NO. 67-344, at 3 (1921).
29 See H.R. REP. NO. 67-361, at 1 (1921) (Conf. Rep.).
30 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (holding that a restricted search by a police officer
for the officer’s protection does not require a warrant in reasonable and dangerous
circumstances).
31 See Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 309–311 (1921) (holding that papers
possessing evidentiary value, but no pecuniary value, may not be taken under search
warrants).
32 Carroll, 267 U.S. at 156. Not long after Carroll was decided, some writers
concluded that it was a limited decision resting on the fact that it was impractical to obtain a
warrant on the facts presented:
26
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This language makes Carroll something of a puzzle. The Court sustained
the power conferred by Congress to engage in warrantless searches by
reasoning that it was impractical to obtain a warrant, but asserted that a
warrant must be used where it was reasonably practical to obtain one.33
The controlling assumption is that warrantless searches of vehicles are
always impractical.
Without knowing the general availability of magistrates and of
resources available to law enforcement for seizing and storing vehicles, it is
impossible to assess how reasonable the Court’s assumption was in 1925.
It is plausible to assume that limited manpower, communications, and
magistrate availability supported the notion that it was generally or
typically impractical to obtain a warrant to search automobiles. The
plausibility increases if one assumes that the Court operated on the
assumption that it was all or nothing: no seizure or search unless there was
a warrant, or seizure and search without a warrant.34
B.

Terry v. Ohio

Seven years after it decided Mapp, the Supreme Court recognized in
Terry v. Ohio35 the right of law enforcement officers to engage in “stop and
frisks” and thus gave its approval to one of the most important tools
available to law enforcement officers.36 Terry recognized that the Fourth
Amendment permitted searches and temporary seizures of individuals upon
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and danger while an officer
In the searching of automobiles, then, where as a practical matter it would be
impossible to procure a warrant in time to effect a search, the same rule applies as
has always held in the case of vessels; namely, that no warrant but only the
existence of probable cause is necessary to constitute the search a reasonable one.
In an appropriate case, however, where the principal basis for this exception as
to movable vehicles does not apply, e.g., where the automobile for some reason
will not be able to be moved or where a vessel, let us say, is firmly beached, and
there consequently is time to respect the safeguard of a warrant, it is reasonable to
suppose that upon the ratio decidendi of the automobile cases a warrant might be
held necessary in such an instance.
LASSON, supra note 2, at 125–26.
33 Carroll, 267 U.S. at 156.
34 There is some evidence that the Court made this assumption. It insisted that the car
was seized before an arrest was made. This meant that, even though the offense of
possessing illegal liquor was a misdemeanor, the crime clearly was in the officer’s presence
because the seizure and search revealed the liquor. By reasoning this way, the Court was
able to defend the warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor by referring to a traditional common
law power. Id. at 156–57. Justice McReynolds dissented and argued that the arrest
preceded the search and that Congress had not authorized a warrantless arrest under these
circumstances. Id. at 163, 166–69 (Reynolds, J., dissenting). The dissent also challenged
the probable cause determination by the majority. Id. at 171–75.
35 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
36 Id. at 30–31. See generally Stephen A. Saltzburg, Terry v. Ohio: A Practically
Perfect Doctrine, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 911 (1998).
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decided whether there was probable cause to arrest.37
Two years after deciding Terry, the Court recognized that the power to
detain upon reasonable suspicion applied to property as well as to people.
In United States v. Van Leeuwen,38 the Court approved of the conduct of
officers who detained mailed packages for more than a day while they
investigated and obtained the probable cause they needed to get a warrant
to search the packages.39 Justice Douglas, the sole dissenter in Terry, wrote
for a unanimous Court in Van Leeuwen and distinguished between seizing
the packages and searching them:
The “protective search for weapons” of a suspect which the Court
approved in Terry v. Ohio, even when probable cause for an arrest
did not exist, went further than we need go here. The only thing
done here on the basis of suspicion was detention of the packages.
There was at that point no possible invasion of the right “to be
secure” in the “persons, houses, papers, and effects” protected by
the Fourth Amendment against “unreasonable searches and
seizures.” Theoretically . . . detention of mail could at some point
become an unreasonable seizure of “papers” or “effects” within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. . . .
No interest protected by the Fourth Amendment was invaded by
forwarding the packages the following day rather than the day
when they were deposited. The significant Fourth Amendment
interest was in the privacy of this first-class mail; and that privacy
was not disturbed or invaded until the approval of the magistrate
was obtained.40
With Terry and Van Leeuwen on the books, the stage was set for another
look at searches of automobiles. It would come in Chambers v. Maroney,41
shortly after Van Leeuwen was decided.42
C.

Chambers v. Maroney

The facts of Chambers are uncomplicated. Two men with guns robbed
a gas station.43 Two teenagers saw a station wagon speed away from the
gas station, learned the station had been robbed, and reported a description
37 The Terry standard is now clearly established as reasonable suspicion, although that
was not true when the case was decided. Saltzburg, supra note 36, at 949.
38 United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249 (1970).
39 Id. at 253.
40 Id. at 252–53 (citation omitted).
41 Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
42 The cases were heard during the same Term.
Van Leeuwen was argued on
February 25, 1970, and decided on March 23, 1970. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. at 249.
Chambers was argued on April 27, 1970, and decided on June 22, 1970. Chambers, 399
U.S. at 42.
43 Chambers, 399 U.S. at 44.
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of what they had seen to the police.44 The police broadcast a description of
the car and the two robbers over the police radio.45 Within an hour, officers
spotted a station wagon meeting the description.46 They arrested the
occupants47 and drove the station wagon to the police station, where they
searched it without a warrant and found evidence used to convict
Chambers.48
The issue before the Court was whether the warrantless search was
reasonable.49 Justice White’s majority opinion, relying on Carroll, held
that it was.50 The majority, however, failed completely to discuss the
language from Carroll quoted above: “In cases where the securing of a
warrant is reasonably practicable, it must be used . . . .”51 The Court also
drew no distinction between the fact patterns of the two cases: Carroll was
a search and seizure of contraband52 while Chambers was a search and
seizure of both contraband and evidence. Justice White cited several postCarroll cases that added little to the Carroll analysis.53 He purported to
recognize that not all warrantless searches of automobiles are reasonable,
and then set forth the alternative options available to the police:
Neither Carroll nor other cases in this Court require or suggest
that in every conceivable circumstance the search of an auto even
with probable cause may be made without the extra protection for
privacy that a warrant affords. But the circumstances that furnish
probable cause to search a particular auto for particular articles are
most often unforeseeable; moreover, the opportunity to search is
fleeting since a car is readily movable. Where this is true, as in
Carroll and the case before us now, if an effective search is to be
made at any time, either the search must be made immediately
without a warrant or the car itself must be seized and held without
a warrant for whatever period is necessary to obtain a warrant for
44

Id.
Id.
46 Id.
47 Although there were two robbers with guns, the teenagers reported that the station
wagon contained four men. When the police stopped the car, it contained four men. Id.
48 Id. at 43–45.
49 Id. at 46–47.
50 Id. at 51–52.
51 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156 (1925).
52 Justice Harlan’s opinion in Chambers, concurring in part and dissenting in part,
pointed out that all prior holdings of the Court regarding warrantless automobile searches
involved contraband. Chambers, 399 U.S. at 62 n.7 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
53 Id. at 49 (majority opinion) (citing Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931)
(warrantless search of automobile for liquor); Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938)
(warrantless search of trunk of automobile for liquor); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S.
160 (1949) (warrantless search of automobile for liquor)).
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the search.54
Justice White then summarized the holding in Carroll:
Only in exigent circumstances will the judgment of the police as
to probable cause serve as a sufficient authorization for a search.
Carroll holds a search warrant unnecessary where there is
probable cause to search an automobile stopped on the highway;
the car is movable, the occupants are alerted, and the car’s
contents may never be found again if a warrant must be obtained.
Hence an immediate search is constitutionally permissible.55
Justice White then confronted the issue not considered in Carroll:
Arguably, because of the preference for a magistrate’s
judgment, only the immobilization of the car should be permitted
until a search warrant is obtained; arguably, only the “lesser”
intrusion is permissible until the magistrate authorizes the
“greater.” But which is the “greater” and which the “lesser”
intrusion is itself a debatable question and the answer may depend
on a variety of circumstances. For constitutional purposes, we see
no difference between on the one hand seizing and holding a car
before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on
the other hand carrying out an immediate search without a
warrant. Given probable cause to search, either course is
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
On the facts before us, the blue station wagon could have been
searched on the spot when it was stopped since there was probable
cause to search and it was a fleeting target for a search. The
probable-cause factor still obtained at the station house and so did
the mobility of the car unless the Fourth Amendment permits a
warrantless seizure of the car and the denial of its use to anyone
until a warrant is secured. In that event there is little to choose in
terms of practical consequences between an immediate search
without a warrant and the car’s immobilization until a warrant is
obtained.56
The most striking thing about this reasoning (or lack thereof) is the
complete failure to recognize what the Court unanimously held three
months earlier in Van Leeuwen: there is a tremendous difference between
seizing an object while securing a warrant and searching the contents of the
object.57 Almost equally striking is the Court’s suggestion that the station
wagon was still mobile after the police stopped it, arrested the occupants,
54
55
56
57

Id. at 50–51 (citation omitted).
Id. at 51 (citation omitted).
Id. at 51–52 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
See United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 252–53 (1970).
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and took control of the vehicle.58 The facts clearly demonstrate that not
only could the police render the vehicle immobile to all but themselves, but
they could (and did) remove the vehicle to a location under their control.
Justice Harlan responded to Justice White:
The Court concedes that the police could prevent removal of the
evidence by temporarily seizing the car for the time necessary to
obtain a warrant. It does not dispute that such a course would
fully protect the interests of effective law enforcement; rather it
states that whether temporary seizure is a “lesser” intrusion than
warrantless search is itself a debatable question and the answer
may depend on a variety of circumstances. I believe it clear that a
warrantless search involves the greater sacrifice of Fourth
Amendment values.
The Fourth Amendment proscribes, to be sure, unreasonable
“seizures” as well as “searches.” However, in the circumstances
in which this problem is likely to occur, the lesser intrusion will
almost always be the simple seizure of the car for the period—
perhaps a day—necessary to enable the officers to obtain a search
warrant. In the first place, as this case shows, the very facts
establishing probable cause to search will often also justify arrest
of the occupants of the vehicle. Since the occupants themselves
are to be taken into custody, they will suffer minimal further
inconvenience from the temporary immobilization of their vehicle.
Even where no arrests are made, persons who wish to avoid a
search—either to protect their privacy or to conceal incriminating
evidence—will almost certainly prefer a brief loss of the use of
the vehicle in exchange for the opportunity to have a magistrate
pass upon the justification for the search. To be sure, one can
conceive of instances in which the occupant, having nothing to
hide and lacking concern for the privacy of the automobile, would
be more deeply offended by a temporary immobilization of his
vehicle than by a prompt search of it. However, such a person
always remains free to consent to an immediate search, thus
avoiding any delay. Where consent is not forthcoming, the
occupants of the car have an interest in privacy that is protected by
the Fourth Amendment even where the circumstances justify a
temporary seizure.59
Justice Harlan cited Terry, but he ignored the more recent and more
relevant decision in Van Leeuwen.60 The most powerful line in his opinion
58

See Chambers, 399 U.S. at 52.
Id. at 63–64 (quotation omitted) (citations omitted) (Harlan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
60 See Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. at 252–53.
59
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is relegated to a footnote: “The Court, unable to decide whether search or
temporary seizure is the ‘lesser’ intrusion, in this case authorizes both.”61
Justice Harlan was charitable to the majority, for his footnote makes clear
that the majority did not realize that one plus one equals two, and that two
is a larger number than one. A seizure is one intrusion, while a search is
another. The two together amount to one intrusion greater than a seizure
standing alone.
D.

Houses That Are Automobiles

Carroll distinguished between a “dwelling house or other structure in
respect of which a proper official warrant readily may be obtained, and a
search of a ship, motor boat, wagon or automobile . . . .”62 The question
that was bound to arise was whether a home that had wheels was a
dwelling house or an automobile for Fourth Amendment purposes. In the
final year of the Burger Court, the Supreme Court answered this question in
California v. Carney.63
Carney’s motor home was under surveillance by drug enforcement
agents when a young man entered, stayed a while, and left.64 The agents
confronted him and learned that he had received marijuana from Carney in
exchange for sex.65 The agents prevailed upon the young man to return to
the motor home and knock on its door.66 When Carney stepped out, the
agents identified themselves and, “[w]ithout a warrant or consent, one
agent entered the motor home and observed marijuana, plastic bags, and a
scale of the kind used in weighing drugs on a table.”67 The agents arrested
Carney and took possession of the motor home.68 “A subsequent search of
the motor home at the police station revealed additional marijuana in the
cupboards and refrigerator.”69 Both searches of the motor home were
warrantless.70
Perhaps realizing that a motor home is not as easily moved as a regular
car, the Court noted that mobility was not the only justification for the
Carroll rule.71 The Court emphasized that there is a lesser expectation of
privacy in cars than in other places.72 Ultimately, the Court concluded that
61
62
63
64
65
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67
68
69
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72

Chambers, 399 U.S. at 63 n.8 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925).
California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985).
Id. at 388.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 391.
Id. at 392.
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motor homes are sufficiently mobile to be treated as automobiles even
though people live in them.73 It left open, however, the question of whether
a mobile home could be treated as an automobile if there were objective
indications that it was being used as a residence and not for
transportation.74
The Court ignored, as it did in Chambers, the fact that the police took
possession of the motor home, transported it to the police station,
controlled it exclusively, and made certain that they controlled its
movement. Once the agents seized the motor home, it was no more mobile
for Carney than the station wagon was for Chambers after the police seized
it.75
E.

Property in Automobiles Prior to the Rehnquist Court

Because of the bankrupt state of the mobility doctrine and the
difficulty after Terry and Van Leeuwen of justifying a warrantless search of
property (where a seizure pending the obtaining of a warrant is
practicable), it is not surprising that the arbitrariness of the automobile
exception has led to inconsistent and confusing decisions. This happened
as the Court addressed moveable property in cars.
Because cars are mobile, it obviously follows that items that can fit
into cars are also mobile. Indeed, any object that is capable of fitting into a
vehicle is as mobile as the vehicle itself. Should this mean that government
agents should be able to seize and search any such item without a warrant?
The Court said “no” in United States v. Chadwick.76 Amtrak railroad
officials in San Diego became suspicious of a footlocker that was loaded
onto a train heading for Boston.77 When the train arrived in Boston, federal
agents were waiting.78 The two men who had brought the footlocker from
San Diego met Chadwick at the station, and with the help of an attendant,
lifted the footlocker into the trunk of Chadwick’s waiting car.79 Before the
trunk closed and the car started, the federal agents arrested Chadwick and
the two San Diego men.80 The agents took the arrestees and Chadwick’s
car with the footlocker to the Federal Building in Boston, where they
conducted a warrantless search of the footlocker and found large quantities
of marijuana.81
The case boiled down to two arguments that are as amusing as they are
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81

Id. at 393–94.
Id. at 394 n.3.
See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 43–44 (1970).
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id. at 4–5.

1716

The George Washington Law Review

[Vol. 74:1702

strange. The government argued that a footlocker was not a house, and
therefore a warrant should not be required to search it.82 Chadwick and the
other defendants argued that the footlocker was not a car, and therefore a
warrant was required.83 The Supreme Court, using its wisdom and
experience from its earlier automobile cases, agreed with both parties by
holding that a footlocker was neither a house nor a car.84 In the end,
though, the Court concluded that a footlocker in the trunk of a car was
more like a house than a car.85
One bit of Chief Justice Burger’s reasoning was especially memorable:
“Unlike an automobile, whose primary function is transportation, luggage
is intended as a repository of personal effects. In sum, a person’s
expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in
an automobile.”86 This is amazing. Most people who have not been
trained in Fourth Amendment law, if asked what the purpose of luggage is,
would reply that it is used for traveling. After all, what is more mobile than
luggage? And how do most people get their luggage from place to place?
The trip usually begins in a car or taxi, which is how most people transport
their private and personal effects from one place to another. Cars are
vehicles for transporting people and their things, even their most private
things. But the Court in Chadwick insisted on treating luggage in cars as
more worthy than the cars themselves. Incredibly, the Court concluded that
people have a greater expectation of privacy in a container that is placed in
a car than in a container that is part of a car.87 The Court did not explain its
conclusion, which is not surprising given that it doesn’t really matter
whether one puts something in the trunk, in the glove compartment, or in a
bag which is then placed in a car—the effect is still the same.
In Arkansas v. Sanders,88 the Court held that a warrant was required to
search a suitcase that had been placed in the trunk of a taxi.89 The Court
reasoned that although the police had probable cause to search the suitcase,
they did not have the authority to search the suitcase absent a warrant
because it was practicable to keep the suitcase secure in police custody
while a warrant was sought.90
In the Court’s next automobile exception case, Robbins v. California,91
82

Id. at 7.
Id. at 12.
84 Id. at 12–13.
85 Id. at 13.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
89 Id. at 765.
90 Id. at 761, 766.
91 Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981) (plurality opinion), overruled by United
States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
83
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California Highway Patrol officers stopped a station wagon driven by
Robbins because he had been driving erratically.92 Robbins left his car,
walked towards the patrol car, and fumbled with his wallet when asked for
his driver’s license and registration.93 When he opened the car door, the
officers smelled marijuana smoke.94 One officer patted Robbins down and
discovered a vial of liquid.95 The officer searched the passenger
compartment and found both marijuana and paraphernalia.96 After the
officers put Robbins in the patrol car, they opened the tailgate of the station
wagon where they uncovered a recessed luggage compartment containing a
tote bag and two packages wrapped in green opaque plastic.97 The police
unwrapped the packages and found that each contained fifteen pounds of
marijuana.98
The issue before the Court was whether the police could search the
green opaque plastic packages (i.e., garbage bags) without a warrant.99
Justice Stewart’s plurality opinion, which relied upon Chadwick and
Sanders, declined to treat one person’s garbage bags as less worthy of
protection than another person’s footlocker or suitcase.100 Justice Powell
concurred only in the judgment and objected to what he regarded as the
plurality’s “bright line” rule.101 He concluded that “the law of search and
seizure with respect to automobiles is intolerably confusing. The Court
apparently cannot agree even on what it has held previously, let alone on
how these cases should be decided.”102
Then, in United States v. Ross,103 the Court appeared determined to
eliminate some of the confusion as it upheld the warrantless search of a
car.104 In Ross, a police informant telephoned a District of Columbia Police
Department detective and told him that an individual known as “Bandit”
was selling narcotics kept in the trunk of a car parked at a particular
location.105 After the informant had observed “Bandit” complete a sale,
“Bandit” had told him that the trunk contained more narcotics.106 The
informant gave a detailed description of “Bandit” and stated that the car
92
93
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95
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Id. at 422.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 423.
Id. at 428.
Id. at 429, 430 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 430.
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
Id. at 800.
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Id.
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was a “purplish maroon” Chevrolet Malibu with District of Columbia
license plates.107 The detective and two other officers immediately drove to
the area and found a maroon Malibu parked in front of the identified
location.108 Through a license plate check, they discovered that the car was
registered to Albert Ross, and a computer check on Ross revealed that he
used the alias “Bandit” and matched the informant’s description.109
The officers initially could not find anyone meeting the description, so
they left the area to avoid arousing suspicion.110 They returned a few
minutes later and observed the maroon Malibu being driven.111 They
pulled alongside the car, noticed that the driver matched the informant’s
description, pulled the car over, and ordered the driver out of the vehicle.112
Ross was the driver.113 While the officers searched him, another officer
searched the car’s interior, discovering a bullet on the car’s front seat and a
pistol in the glove compartment.114 They arrested Ross, took his keys,
opened the trunk, found a closed brown paper bag, opened the bag and
discovered a number of glassine bags containing a white powder later
determined to be heroin.115 They drove the car to headquarters, searched it
again, and found in the trunk a zippered red leather pouch with $3200 in
cash.116
Justice Stevens’s opinion for the Court distinguished Chadwick and
Sanders as cases where probable cause existed to search the containers
inside the cars, not the vehicles themselves.117 In Ross, however, the
probable cause existed to search the car itself.118 Justice Stevens explained
as follows:
The scope of a warrantless search of an automobile thus is not
defined by the nature of the container in which the contraband is
secreted. Rather, it is defined by the object of the search and the
places in which there is probable cause to believe that it may be
found. Just as probable cause to believe that a stolen lawnmower
may be found in a garage will not support a warrant to search an
upstairs bedroom, probable cause to believe that undocumented
aliens are being transported in a van will not justify a warrantless
107
108
109
110
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112
113
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search of a suitcase. Probable cause to believe that a container
placed in the trunk of a taxi contains contraband or evidence does
not justify a search of the entire cab.119
Justice Blackmun, who dissented in the prior cases,120 wrote a
concurring opinion in which he joined the Court’s opinion because it was
important “that the applicable legal rules be clearly established.”121 He
continued, “Justice Stevens’ opinion for the Court now accomplishes much
in this respect, and it should clarify a good bit of the confusion that has
existed.”122 Justice Powell also wrote a concurring opinion indicating that
he agreed that it was important to have clear rules, and that Justice
Stevens’s opinion reduced the uncertainty in the law and was consistent
with Carroll and Chambers.123
Ironically, Justice Powell’s objection to “bright line” rules disappeared
when the rules set down permitted rather than restricted searches. Six
Justices now seemed to believe that Ross had done the trick by resolving
the chaos created by prior decisions.
F.

California v. Acevedo

The Rehnquist Court cannot be blamed for these automobile decisions.
Chief Justice Rehnquist was not a member of the Courts that decided
Carroll and Chambers. He joined Justice Blackmun’s dissenting opinions
in Chadwick124 and Sanders,125 and wrote his own dissenting opinion in
Robbins126 before joining the majority in Ross. His Robbins dissent
indicated that he preferred a particular bright line rule:
[O]ne need not demonstrate that a particular automobile was
capable of being moved, but that automobiles as a class are
inherently mobile, and a defendant seeking to suppress evidence
obtained from an automobile should not be heard to say that this
particular automobile had broken down, was in a parking lot under
the supervision of the police, or the like.127

119

Id. at 824.
See Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 436 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting);
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 768 (1979) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); United States v.
Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 17 (1977) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
121 Ross, 456 U.S. at 825 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
122 Id.
123 Id. at 826 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell also wrote that Justice Stevens’s
opinion was consistent with the Court’s decision from the previous Term in New York v.
Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), which is discussed infra at note 186. Ross, 456 U.S. at 826
(Powell, J., concurring)
124 See Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 17 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
125 See Sanders, 442 U.S. at 768 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
126 See Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 437 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
127 Id. at 440–41.
120
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Because he did not write separately in Ross, we cannot know whether he
thought that Ross adopted his rule or whether, like Justices Blackmun and
Powell, he thought that Ross eliminated the confusion in prior cases.
We do know, however, that less than ten years after the Court decided
Ross, the Rehnquist Court found it necessary to return to the automobile
exception because confusion remained. This case was California v.
Acevedo.128
In Acevedo, a federal drug enforcement agent in Hawaii telephoned a
California police department, informing the department that a package
containing marijuana, originally destined for California, had been seized in
Hawaii and that the package was supposed to be delivered to a Federal
Express office in California.129 The agent sent the package to the
California police department, which then took it to the Federal Express
office.130 Jamie Daza arrived at the office, picked up the package, and
drove his car with the package to an apartment.131 Charles Acevedo arrived
at the apartment, stayed for ten minutes, and left carrying a full paper bag
that was about the same size as one of the original packages.132 After
placing the bag in the trunk of his car, he started to drive away.133 He was
immediately stopped by police, who opened the trunk and found the
marijuana.134
Acevedo’s case exposed the confusion that continued to exist in lower
courts despite Ross. The California Court of Appeals concluded that the
marijuana evidence should have been suppressed because, even though the
police had probable cause to believe that the paper bag (which was not an
automobile) had marijuana in it, they did not have probable cause to
believe that the automobile otherwise contained marijuana.135 The court of
appeals held that because the police only had probable cause to believe that
the paper bag contained marijuana, they had to, yet failed to, obtain a
search warrant before opening it.136
Justice Blackmun wrote for the Court as it reversed.137 The Acevedo
Court had the opportunity to abandon its prior approach and apply a
principled approach to searches of automobiles. All it had to do was say
that, absent exigent circumstances, property could be seized for a
128
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temporary period upon reasonable suspicion, and for a longer period upon
probable cause, while a warrant is sought. Such a holding would have
recognized that most property is mobile, can be moved by car, train, or
plane, and regardless of whether it happens to be in a house or in a car,
cannot be moved while a warrant is sought if the house or car is under the
control of the police.
Instead, Justice Blackmun held that containers in cars can be searched
as long as there is probable cause.138 He recognized that, despite the hope
he expressed in Ross that it would make the rules governing automobile
searches clearer, “[t]he line between probable cause to search a vehicle and
probable cause to search a package in that vehicle is not always
clear . . . .”139 He also recognized that the Court’s prior decisions created
“separate rules that govern the two objects to be searched [that] may enable
the police to broaden their power to make warrantless searches and disserve
privacy interests.”140 Justice Blackmun further reasoned:
At the moment when officers stop an automobile, it may be less
than clear whether they suspect with a high degree of certainty
that the vehicle contains drugs in a bag or simply contains drugs.
If the police know that they may open a bag only if they are
actually searching the entire car, they may search more
extensively than they otherwise would in order to establish the
general probable cause required by Ross.141
This is strange reasoning. Police who stop a car cannot search it
completely under any circumstances without probable cause, even under
the Court’s prior decisions. The question for officers is whether they have
probable cause to believe. They cannot choose to search a car simply
because they would like to open packages. Ross required that there be
probable cause to believe that the car, as opposed to a package in the car,
contained contraband that could be searched for.142 Ross did give police an
incentive to gather more general, as opposed to specific, information about
precisely what type of container drugs or evidence might be found in. But
Ross did not give police the power to expand a search when they lacked
probable cause with respect to the car itself.143
Justice Blackmun’s reasoning cannot be confined to automobiles. In
138

Id. at 580.
Id. at 574.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 574–75.
142 United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982).
143 Justice Blackmun cited United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478 (1985), as an example
of law enforcement expanding a search. Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 575. But the Court held in
Johns that agents had probable cause to search trucks and therefore could search packages
seized from trucks. Johns, 469 U.S. at 482. It did not hold that agents who lacked probable
cause as to a vehicle could search either the vehicle or packages within it.
139
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Acevedo, he cited his own earlier dissent:
To the extent that the Chadwick-Sanders rule protects privacy,
its protection is minimal. Law enforcement officers may seize a
container and hold it until they obtain a search warrant. “Since
the police, by hypothesis, have probable cause to seize the
property, we can assume that a warrant will be routinely
forthcoming in the overwhelming majority of cases.”144
While his assumption is fair, it applies to all property, not just automobiles.
The Court has never cited a shred of evidence to support the notion that law
enforcement officers make better probable cause judgments about cars or
containers in cars than they make about other property.145
Justice Blackmun suggested that the Court was finally ending the
confusion over automobile searches with its Acevedo decision:
Until today, this Court has drawn a curious line between the
search of an automobile that coincidentally turns up a container
and the search of a container that coincidentally turns up in an
automobile. The protections of the Fourth Amendment must not
turn on such coincidences. We therefore interpret Carroll as
providing one rule to govern all automobile searches. The police
may search an automobile and the containers within it where they
have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is
contained.146
Unfortunately, the suggestion was wrong, and confusion remains.
Suppose, for example, police have probable cause to believe that a bag of
marijuana is in the trunk of a car. Can they search the entire car? The full
trunk? Only the part of the trunk that contains a bag?147 It will take yet
another Supreme Court decision to provide an answer.

144 Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 575 (citation omitted) (quoting Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S.
753, 770 (1979) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
145 Justice Blackmun added that “the police often will be able to search containers
without a warrant, despite the Chadwick-Sanders rule, as a search incident to a lawful
arrest.” Id. But as we shall see, that is because the Court has adopted a special rule for
searching automobiles incident to arrest that is as arbitrary as the automobile exception to
the warrant requirement.
146 Id. at 580.
147 See Bruce A. Green, “Power, Not Reason”: Justice Marshall’s Valedictory and the
Fourth Amendment in the Supreme Court’s 1990 Term, 70 N.C. L. REV. 373, 394 (1992)
(arguing that following Acevedo, a defendant “may challenge a search of areas of the car
other than the targeted container”). Compare United States v. McSween, 53 F.3d 684, 686
(5th Cir. 1995) (holding that an officer who smelled burnt marijuana could search under the
hood of a car after a fruitless search of the passenger compartment), with United States v.
Nielsen, 9 F.3d 1487, 1491 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that an officer who smelled burnt
marijuana could not search the trunk after a fruitless search of the passenger compartment).
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The Problem with Arbitrary Rules

The problem with arbitrary rules like the automobile exception to the
warrant requirement is that because they have no principled basis, they
provide no guidance as to how law enforcement officers should deal with a
new set of facts.
For example, suppose Federal Express telephones law enforcement
agents to report a suspicious package which is emitting an odor or leaking
powder, suggesting it might contain drugs. The package was just offloaded from a truck. Can the package be searched without a warrant?
After all, it is mobile, it has actually been moved, and it could be moved
again. Does the fact that it was recently in a vehicle bring it within the
automobile exception? It will take a new Supreme Court decision for
anyone to be sure.
Consider another scenario, where the police have probable cause to
believe that a bicycle might contain drugs in a saddle bag. Is a bicycle the
equivalent of an automobile so that it can be searched without a warrant?
What about a tricycle? Only the new Supreme Court can tell us.
What qualifies an item as a vehicle? Is a suitcase or a shopping cart
with wheels the equivalent of an automobile? What about a wagon or a
cart? The rule favored by then–Associate Justice Rehnquist in Robbins—
one need not demonstrate that a particular automobile was
capable of being moved, but that automobiles as a class are
inherently mobile, and a defendant seeking to suppress evidence
obtained from an automobile should not be heard to say that this
particular automobile had broken down, was in a parking lot under
the supervision of the police, or the like148
—suggests that a car that has no engine or an engine that does not work
still falls within the automobile exception. But the rule still does not
answer the basic question: what is a car?
What about a delivery person on inline skates who the police believe is
unknowingly carrying a package with drugs? Is he or she equivalent to an
automobile?
In a sensible world, one would neither ask nor answer these questions.
Instead, one would adopt a principle that would enable future actors to
respond logically to new circumstances. That principle would recognize
that automobiles and all other moveable property should be treated the
same way. If moveable property outside automobiles generally can be
detained while a warrant is sought and searched only after such warrant has
been obtained (absent exigent circumstances), the same rule should apply
to automobiles. If it did, we would not have to worry about the proper
148 Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 440–41 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting),
overruled by United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
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treatment of bicycles, tricycles, wagons, shopping carts, luggage with
wheels, and inline skating delivery personnel.
II.

More on Automobiles: Search Incident to Arrest

The Supreme Court has treated automobiles with disfavor not only by
establishing the automobile exception discussed above, but also in its
handling of the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine.
The Court has
abandoned a rational, principled rule governing searches incident to arrest
in favor of an arbitrary and confusing approach.
A.

The Pendulum Swings

Until 1969, the Court wavered in its approach to searches incident to
arrest. The Carroll case, discussed above,149 offered the first dictum
suggesting that a search incident to arrest could extend beyond the person
arrested to the place where the person was arrested: “When a man is legally
arrested for an offense, whatever is found upon his person or in his control
which it is unlawful for him to have and which may be used to prove the
offense may be seized and held as evidence in the prosecution.”150 Decided
shortly after Carroll, Agnello v. United States151 relied in part upon Carroll
for this dictum:
The right without a search warrant contemporaneously to search
persons lawfully arrested while committing crime and to search
the place where the arrest is made in order to find and seize things
connected with the crime as its fruits or as the means by which it
was committed, as well as weapons and other things to effect an
escape from custody, is not to be doubted.152
As often happens, dictum leads to holding. In Marron v. United
States,153 agents executing a warrant to search a speakeasy for liquor and
related items seized an incriminating ledger that was not in the warrant.154
The Court justified the seizure by holding that because the agents had made
an arrest on the premises, “[t]hey had a right without a warrant
contemporaneously to search the place in order to find and seize the things
used to carry on the criminal enterprise.”155
But in Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States156 and United States v.
149

See supra text accompanying notes 12–34.
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158 (1925) (emphasis added).
151 Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
152 Id. at 30 (citing Carroll, 267 U.S. at 158, and Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.
383, 392 (1914)). Weeks did not actually discuss searching places incident to arrest.
153 Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
154 Id. at 193–94.
155 Id. at 199.
156 Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931).
150
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Lefkowitz,157 the Court distinguished Marron as involving only a slight
intrusion158 as it held two postarrest premises searches unconstitutional. In
Go-Bart Importing Co., the Court held that the search of an office and the
seizure of papers from a desk, a safe, and other parts of the office were
forbidden.159 In Lefkowitz, the Court held that the search of an office and
seizures from a desk and cabinet in the office were not justifiable.160
The restrictive attitude toward searches incident to arrest was cast
aside in Harris v. United States,161 as the Court approved a search of a
four-room apartment in which officers arrested Harris on the basis of his
alleged involvement with the cashing and interstate transportation of a
forged check.162 The officers had searched for two cancelled checks
thought to have been used in effecting the forgery.163
In the Court’s own words, “[o]nly a year after Harris, however, the
pendulum swung again.”164 The case was Trupiano v. United States.165
Despite the fact that agents made lawful arrests of individuals running an
illegal distillery, the Court held that a search of the premises was invalid:
A search or seizure without a warrant as an incident to a lawful
arrest has always been considered to be a strictly limited right. It
grows out of the inherent necessities of the situation at the time of
the arrest. But there must be something more in the way of
necessity than merely a lawful arrest.166
The pendulum would swing again just two years later in United States
v. Rabinowitz.167 Federal authorities secured an arrest warrant for
Rabinowitz for dealing in stamps bearing forged overprints.168 They
arrested him at his one-room business office and searched his desk, safe,

157

United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932).
The Court reasoned that the articles seized in Marron were “visible and accessible
and in the offender’s immediate custody. There was no threat of force or general search or
rummaging of the place.” Go-Bart Importing Co., 282 U.S. at 358. The Court here
essentially anticipated the future “plain-view” rule. See, e.g., Horton v. California, 496 U.S.
128, 142 (1990) (holding that the seizure of weapons allegedly used in a robbery was
authorized by the “plain-view” doctrine, despite the lack of specific authorization in the
warrant to search for weapons).
159 Go-Bart Importing Co., 282 U.S. at 358.
160 Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. at 467.
161 Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
162 Id. at 148, 155.
163 Id. at 148.
164 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 758 (1969).
165 Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948), overruled in part by United States
v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
166 Id. at 708.
167 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
168 Id. at 57–58.
158
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and file cabinets.169 The Court, relying on Harris, upheld the search, citing
a number of factors:
We think the District Court’s conclusion that here the search and
seizure were reasonable should be sustained because: (1) the
search and seizure were incident to a valid arrest; (2) the place of
the search was a business room to which the public, including the
officers, was invited; (3) the room was small and under the
immediate and complete control of respondent; (4) the search did
not extend beyond the room used for unlawful purposes; (5) the
possession of the forged and altered stamps was a crime, just as it
is a crime to possess burglars’ tools, lottery tickets or counterfeit
money.170
The Court rejected the notion that a warrantless search was invalid if a
warrant could have been secured.171 It reasoned that it was well understood
that some searches incident to arrest were reasonable without a warrant, so
the Fourth Amendment could not be said to prohibit all such warrantless
searches.172 But the Court confined itself to reciting the factors relied upon
by the district court. It failed completely to explain what rationale or
principle distinguished unreasonable and reasonable warrantless searches
incident to arrest.
B.

A Principled Approach

Finally, in Chimel v. California,173 the Court explained the
justifications for the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine. In so doing, it
stated a clear and logical principle that guided arresting officers in
determining the proper scope of such searches.
Three police officers arrived at Chimel’s home with a warrant for his
arrest for the burglary of a coin shop.174 Chimel’s wife let the officers wait
in the house until Chimel returned.175 When he returned, the officers
arrested him and, over Chimel’s objection, conducted a search of the threebedroom house, including the attic, the garage, and a small workshop.176
The Court held that the search violated the Fourth Amendment.177
Justice Stewart’s opinion for the Court explained that a search incident
to arrest had two legitimate purposes: to protect the arresting officer and to

169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177

Id. at 58–59.
Id. at 63–64 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 65.
Id. at 65–66.
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
Id. at 753.
Id.
Id. at 753–54.
Id. at 768.
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protect against destruction or loss of evidence.178 The purpose of the
search therefore dictated its permitted scope:
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to
search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the
latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape.
Otherwise, the officer’s safety might well be endangered, and the
arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the
arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the
arrestee’s person in order to prevent its concealment or
destruction. And the area into which an arrestee might reach in
order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items must, of course, be
governed by a like rule.179
Chimel demonstrates two realities about principled rules. First, if the
principle is clear, application by ordinary people should be relatively easy
in most cases. Second, no matter how clear the principle, at the outer
margins of any rule, judgment will be required.
After Chimel, any reasonable officer who made a custodial arrest knew
that he or she may search the physical person of a suspect for weapons and
for evidence that might be destroyed. Any reasonable officer also knew
that he or she may also search the area in which a suspect might grab a
weapon or evidence.
C.

The Principle Eroded

Judgment is required, however, if the principle is to be meaningful.
Just four years after deciding Chimel, the Court per Justice Rehnquist
decided United States v. Robinson.180 A District of Columbia police
officer, who had checked the status of Robinson’s license a few days
earlier, stopped Robinson’s car and arrested him for driving after his
license was revoked and for obtaining a license by misrepresentation.181
The officer conducted a search incident to arrest in which he found a
crumpled up cigarette package in Robinson’s breast pocket, which the
officer removed and opened. He found fourteen gelatin capsules which
turned out to contain heroin.182 The issue was whether opening the
package was legitimate. The Court said it was, announcing another bright
line rule that “a full search of the person” is always reasonable when
incident to a custodial arrest.183
178

Id. at 762–63.
Id.
180 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
181 Id. at 220.
182 Id. at 221–23.
183 Id. at 235. The Court stated,
It is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the authority to search, and we
179

1728

The George Washington Law Review

[Vol. 74:1702

But Robinson was not about the full search of a person; it was about
the search of a container found on a person. If an officer could not
reasonably believe that a container could contain a weapon or evidence,
why should the officer be permitted to search it? The Court’s answer
seemed to be that, without a per se rule, courts would have to litigate the
reasonableness of the officer’s judgment in every case.184
This is not necessarily true. Because a custodial arrest is always an
unwelcome experience for the arrestee, and could therefore spark a violent
reaction against the arresting officer, there is a principled basis for the
Court’s holding that a search for weapons is always permissible—i.e., the
protection of the officer. There is no such principled basis for saying that it
is always reasonable to search for evidence that might be destroyed. When
an officer arrests a person for a crime and there is no possibility of finding
evidence in any container possessed by the arrestee that could be destroyed
by the arrestee, Chimel suggests that there is no reason to permit a search
for evidence.
The Robinson Court never considered an approach that would have
been more consistent with Chimel: i.e., (1) an officer always may search
the arrested person for weapons and search any container from which the
suspect could get a weapon; (2) once an officer has determined that a
suspect has no weapon or has disarmed the suspect, the officer may only
continue to search a container for evidence as long as there is some
possibility that it contains evidence and the suspect remains capable of
opening the container and destroying the contents; and (3) thereafter, the
officer may only seize a container to bring before a magistrate in order to
seek a warrant to search it further.
Would this be too complicated? Absolutely not. Under this
alternative, officers would know that they can always conduct a search for
weapons incident to arrest to protect their safety, and furthermore they
would know that they can search for evidence as long as it is in danger of
being destroyed. When the dangers of physical harm or destruction of
evidence disappear, the reason for a warrantless search also disappears.
This is hardly rocket science, because it is a staple of Fourth Amendment
law in other contexts.185

hold that in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not
only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also
a ‘reasonable’ search under that Amendment.
Id.
184

See id.
See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393–95 (1978) (rejecting a “murder
scene exception” to the warrant requirement and holding that when exigency disappears, a
warrant is required).
185
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The Automobile and Search Incident to Arrest

While Robinson eroded to some extent the principle established in
Chimel, New York v. Belton186 essentially ignored the Chimel principle.
This was somewhat surprising because Justice Stewart, the author of
Chimel, wrote for the Court in Belton.
In Belton, a New York state trooper driving an unmarked car saw
another car speeding on the New York Thruway, chased the car, pulled it
over, and asked to see the driver’s license and registration.187 He
discovered that none of the men in the car owned it or were related to its
owner, smelled burnt marijuana in the car, and saw an envelope marked
“Supergold” on the floor of the car, which he associated with marijuana.188
The trooper ordered the four male occupants out of the car, placed them all
under arrest, patted them down, placed them in four different areas outside
the car, picked up the envelope, found that it contained marijuana, gave the
men Miranda warnings,189 and searched them all incident to arrest.190 The
officer also searched the passenger compartment of the car, found a black
jacket belonging to Belton, searched it, and found cocaine.191 The officer
put the jacket and the men in his car and drove them to the police station.192
There is little doubt that the officer acted properly in all respects. He
properly stopped the vehicle for speeding and requested to see the driver’s
license and registration. After he smelled burnt marijuana and saw the
envelope, he had probable cause to believe that the men were sharing
marijuana and appropriately arrested them. The search of their persons
incident to arrest was clearly valid.
The officer also had probable cause to believe that there was marijuana
in the car. Because the officer was determined to take the men into
custody, it was reasonable for him to search the interior of the car for the
marijuana rather than leave it for whoever might come along while the car
sat unprotected on the Thruway. The search of the car was an exigentcircumstance search—the officer obviously could not remove the men and
protect the car at the same time. Of course, an officer can always call for
backup, but there is no constitutional requirement that an officer always do
so, and there is no unlimited supply of backup for every stop and arrest an
officer might make.
Rather than treat the case as a classic example of exigent
circumstances, Justice Stewart’s opinion for the Court recognized that
186
187
188
189
190
191
192

New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
Id. at 455.
Id. at 455–56.
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467–73 (1966).
Belton, 453 U.S. at 456.
Id.
Id.
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Chimel set forth a principled rule, suggested that the rule was confusing
and that a clearer rule for cars was needed,193 and adopted a per se rule for

193

Justice Stewart noted,
Although the principle that limits a search incident to a lawful custodial arrest
may be stated clearly enough, courts have discovered the principle difficult to
apply in specific cases. Yet, as one commentator has pointed out, the protection of
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments “can only be realized if the police are
acting under a set of rules which, in most instances, makes it possible to reach a
correct determination beforehand as to whether an invasion of privacy is justified in
the interest of law enforcement.”
Id. at 458 (quoting Wayne R. LaFave, “Case-by-Case Adjudication” Versus “Standardized
Procedures”: The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 127, 142). Although Justice
Stewart made the assertion about the difficulty lower courts were having, he cited no cases
to illustrate the point. It is difficult to see why lower courts would have found Chimel
difficult to apply. Its principle is easy to state, and it requires only a limited amount of
judgment.
Elsewhere in the opinion, however, Justice Stewart purported to identify examples
of confusion in the lower courts. See id. at 459 & n.1. After evaluating these cases
mentioned by Justice Stewart, Professor David S. Rudstein concluded that “some of the
cases cited by the Court in Belton as examples of cases reaching inconsistent results may not
have done so.” David S. Rudstein, Belton Redux: Reevaluating Belton’s Per Se Rule
Governing the Search of an Automobile Incident to an Arrest, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
1287, 1324–27, 1324 n.191 (2005). Professor Rudstein’s description of the cases and the
issues they address is insightful and demonstrates the kind of questions that can arise when
officers arrest individuals in cars. I agree with his conclusion that the Court failed to justify
the per se rule in Belton. Id. at 1287–88. Although it is true that the cited cases involved
cars in one way or another, it would be wrong to assume that any confusion in the lower
courts actually arose because of the presence of a car in the cases. The same issues
involving cars arose in other contexts in which people were arrested. The confusion
occurred because police naturally want to take full advantage of the permissible “free
search” (i.e., the automatic search) following an arrest. To take full advantage, they may
seek to expand the scope of the search as much as possible.
For example, an officer might arrest someone in her home while she is sitting next
to a locked suitcase or chest, handcuff her and remove the suitcase from her reach. The
officer may want to search the suitcase. Once the suitcase is out of reach of the arrestee,
however, there is no greater reason to permit a warrantless search than if the suitcase were
in the next room when the arrest occurred. If the Court were to say that when the exigency
ended (i.e., when the reasonable possibility that a suspect could reach into a place for a
weapon or evidence dissipated), the search-incident-to-arrest exception becomes
inapplicable, the Court would be true to the principles set forth in Chimel and to its
emphasis on the Warrant Clause and judicial supervision over searches absent true exigent
circumstances. Moreover, a focus on whether an actual exigency exits would make clear to
law enforcement officers that exigent circumstances permit immediate reactions without the
necessity of relying on arbitrary doctrines similar to that laid down in Belton.
One gets a feeling from the lower court cases that judges feel that the police are
somehow “cheated” if they remove the exigency before they have conducted a search. One
example of this is found in United States v. Frick, 490 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1973). The court
held that a search incident to arrest was valid where the defendant was arrested before he
entered his car (thus making it not a true Belton situation) and his attaché case, which was in
the back seat of his car, was searched. Id. at 669–70. Under these circumstances, it is
difficult to see why an automatic search of the case was more justifiable than it would have
been if the defendant were arrested on the front porch of his house, and the case was inside
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cars with two major parts: (1) “when a policeman has made a lawful
custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a
contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment
of that automobile” and (2) “the police may also examine the contents of
any containers found within the passenger compartment . . . whether it is
open or closed.”194
There was no convincing reason for Belton to abandon Chimel’s
clearly stated principle. The apparent reason for the change was that the
Court realized that in the factual scenario presented in Belton, as well as in
many similar cases, the police would not be able to search a car incident to
arrest under the Chimel rule and did not want to deprive the police of the
opportunity to do so.
When police officers stop cars, they often order the driver and all
passengers out of the car, a practice the Supreme Court has upheld.195 If
the officer makes an arrest and handcuffs a suspect outside the car, often
there is no reasonable possibility that the suspect could seize a weapon or
evidence in the car, especially if the car doors are closed. This means that
had the arrest been made while the suspect was in the car, an officer could
have searched wherever in the car the suspect could have reached, but
when the arrest is made outside the car and there are no exigent
circumstances, the officer loses the right to search the interior of the car.
This is an accurate description of what would happen if Chimel were
applied to the facts of Belton. Why is this a problem? This result is
precisely what Chimel’s principle dictates. A search incident to arrest is
not some right given to officers because the Court thinks officers should
have an entitlement to a “free search”—without probable cause or a
warrant. When the reasons for a warrantless search disappear, such a
search should not be permitted.
The Court in Belton did not say that the decision was intended to give
the police a free search, although that is the end result of the decision.
Instead, Justice Stewart argued that his own opinion in Chimel was
confusing as applied to cars and that there was a need for a clear rule.196
He did not explain, however, why Chimel was more confusing with respect
to cars than any other place where an arrest occurs.
Justice Stewart also failed to recognize that a principled rule always
provides more guidance than an arbitrary one. Fair application of Chimel
would have resulted in a holding in Belton that a search of the car incident
to arrest was not permissible, but would in no way have inhibited the Court

his house not far from the front door.
194 Belton, 453 U.S. at 459–61 (footnotes omitted).
195 See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977) (driver); Maryland v.
Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 410 (1997) (passengers).
196 Belton, 453 U.S. at 460.
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from recognizing that the search of the individuals was nonetheless
permissible, and that the search of the car also was permissible because of
exigent circumstances. A fair application of Chimel would have bolstered
the principle laid down in that case and thereby provided more guidance
than Belton could possibly provide. Belton, as it turned out, was not a clear
rule.
E.

The Confusion of Belton

What is the passenger compartment of a car? Consider the vast range
of options. Are vans and minivans to be treated as though their interiors
are nothing but passenger compartments? Are the storage areas of
hatchbacks part of the passenger compartment if the cover is up, but part of
a trunk if the cover is down?197 How are station wagons to be treated? Is
there a passenger “compartment” of a motorcycle? Justice Brennan asked
some of these questions in his dissenting opinion in Belton.198
There are no easy answers to these questions. There never are when
arbitrary rules are adopted because there is no way to reason from one
arbitrary conclusion to another.
Justice Brennan’s dissent recognized that the situation involving an
arrest of someone who has been in a car is not so different from an arrest of
someone at home.199 A slightly different scenario from the one raised by
the dissent illustrates how the two arrest scenarios could be similar.
Suppose that police officers arrest a person at her home, handcuff her, and
bring her outside. Can they go back and search the part of home they
would have been able to search if the suspect were still inside, i.e., the part
of the home where the suspect could have accessed a weapon or evidence?
Lower courts have disagreed, but there seems to be something of a trend to
saying yes. If it is right to make a search in Belton after it is clear that
danger to officers and destruction of evidence are no longer concerns, why
is it less right to make the same search when a home is involved? The
197 See, e.g., United States v. Doward, 41 F.3d 789, 794 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that
the hatch area of a two-door Ford Mustang generally is within the passenger compartment).
198 Specifically, Justice Brennan asked:
Does [the passenger compartment] include locked glove compartments, the interior
of door panels, or the area under the floorboards? Are special rules necessary for
station wagons and hatchbacks, where the luggage compartment may be reached
through the interior, or taxicabs, where a glass panel might separate the driver’s
compartment from the rest of the car? Are the only containers that may be
searched those that are large enough to be “capable of holding another object”? Or
does the new rule apply to any container, even if it “could hold neither a weapon
nor evidence of the criminal conduct for which the suspect was arrested”?
Belton, 453 U.S. at 470 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
199 Id. Justice Brennan posited, “What if a suspect is seen walking out of a house
where the police, peering in from outside, had formed probable cause to believe a crime was
being committed? Could the police then arrest that suspect and enter the house to conduct a
search incident to arrest?” Id.
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Belton majority provided no answer.
There are at least two other major problems with Belton that can arise
at any place an arrest occurs. First, suppose an arrestee has a locked
suitcase or briefcase that cannot easily be opened, and the arrestee is
subdued and handcuffed. Should the police be permitted to break open the
suitcase or briefcase when there is no possibility that its contents could be
harmful to them or be destroyed? Belton says they can, and it says so in
part because once Robinson eroded the Chimel principle while purporting
to deal only with searches of the person, it was very easy to conclude that
the same principle should apply to containers near the person.200
Second, there is the related question of how long a search incident to
arrest should take. What if it takes bolt cutters to open a container? Can
the police take a half hour at the scene of an arrest to force open a container
they have total control of? If not, for how long can they try to break it
open? Chimel appeared to assume that a search incident would be a quick
search to protect officers and evidence. Belton’s statement that any
container may be searched—open or closed, locked or unlocked—raises
questions of how long as well as why.201
F.

Confusion Reduced or Exacerbated?

As was true of the automobile exception, the Rehnquist Court was not
responsible for Chimel, Robinson, or Belton (although Justice Rehnquist
authored Robinson). The Rehnquist Court did have an opportunity,
however, to reconsider or limit Belton and return to principled
jurisprudence in Thornton v. United States.202
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court as it held that Belton, not
Chimel, applied when police officers arrest a suspect after he or she gets
out of a car.203 The case arose when a Norfolk police officer thought a car
was driving suspiciously.204 The officer checked the license plates and
discovered that they were issued to a different car from the one he saw.205
Meanwhile, Thornton, the driver of the car, drove into a parking lot, parked
200 Not surprisingly, lower courts have read Belton as eliminating any distinction
between searches of persons and searches of objects within an arrestee’s control. See, e.g.,
United States v. Johnson, 846 F.2d 279, 282 (5th Cir. 1988) (“We conclude that Belton
eradicates any differences between searches of the person and searches within the arrestee’s
immediate control.”). A concurring judge wrote that “Belton constituted a virtual overruling
of the rationale of Chimel.” Id. at 284 (Williams, C.J., concurring).
201 A third problem might arise if there is a dispute as to what constitutes a container in
an automobile. See, e.g., United States v. Diaz-Lizaraza, 981 F.2d 1216, 1222 (11th Cir.
1993) (noting that the search of an automobile incident to arrest may not include damaging
the vehicle in any way, including the ripping of upholstery).
202 Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615 (2004).
203 Id. at 620.
204 Id. at 617.
205 Id. at 618.
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his car, and got out of the car.206 After Thornton was out of the car, the
officer approached him and asked for his driver’s license.207 During the
ensuing conversation, Thornton admitted, in response to questions from the
officer, that he had drugs on his person, and produced them for the
officer.208 The officer arrested Thornton, handcuffed him, and put him in
the back seat of his patrol car before searching Thornton’s car and finding a
handgun under the driver’s seat.209
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion concluded that Belton did not turn
on whether the arrest was made in the vehicle, and reasoned,
In all relevant aspects, the arrest of a suspect who is next to a
vehicle presents identical concerns regarding officer safety and the
destruction of evidence as the arrest of one who is inside the
vehicle. An officer may search a suspect’s vehicle under Belton
only if the suspect is arrested.210
This language is incredibly broad, suggesting that any time anyone is
arrested next to a vehicle, that vehicle may be searched incident to arrest.
The opinion also reasoned, “[N]or is an arrestee less likely to attempt to
lunge for a weapon or to destroy evidence if he is outside of, but still in
control of, the vehicle,”211 which suggests that the decision might be
confined to an arrestee’s own vehicle. This, however, is not totally clear.
Even less clear is whether there was any danger of Thornton lunging
into the car after he was arrested. If not, then there was nothing to support
the search as incident to arrest. Chief Justice Rehnquist conceded that there
might have been little or no danger:
It is unlikely in this case that petitioner could have reached under
the driver’s seat for his gun once he was outside of his
automobile. But the firearm and the passenger compartment in
general were no more inaccessible than were the contraband and
the passenger compartment in Belton. The need for a clear rule,
readily understood by police officers and not depending on
differing estimates of what items were or were not within reach of
an arrestee at any particular moment, justifies the sort of
generalization which Belton enunciated.212
206

Id.
Id.
208 Id.
209 Id. Whether the search would qualify as a justified probable-cause, exigentcircumstance search would turn on whether the officer had probable cause to believe that
additional drugs were in the car. If so, given that the car was in a public parking lot, the
officer might well have been warranted in searching it before removing Thornton to the
station house.
210 Id. at 620–21.
211 Id. at 621.
212 Id. at 622–23 (footnote omitted). Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment, wrote
207
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This would be remarkable if it were not so typical of Fourth
Amendment Supreme Court cases. Belton approved of a search incident to
arrest in which neither the officer nor evidence were endangered by
arrestees.213 Thornton extends the Belton rule by analogy: the danger in
Thornton was no less than the danger in Belton because there was no real
danger in either case.214 The original and extended rules are needed,
according to the Court, to provide clarity.215 But there is no more clarity
after Thornton than before. Must a suspect have recently been in a car to
justify a search incident when an arrest is outside the car? If so, how
recently? As Chief Justice Rehnquist put it, “So long as an arrestee is the
sort of ‘recent occupant’ of a vehicle such as petitioner was here, officers
may search that vehicle incident to the arrest.”216 This is not clear guidance
to police officers.
What if a suspect steps out of his home, opens his trunk, removes a
bag, and closes the trunk? Is he the sort of “recent occupant” the Chief
Justice described? Who knows?
Moreover, Thornton provides no guidance as to a suspect who
approaches a car. Does the Belton rule apply to future occupants of
vehicles? If so, must the officer know whose car the suspect is
approaching? Some day, the Supreme Court may answer these questions.
It should be obvious that such bright line rules are not so bright and are
hardly understandable as rules. Even Justices who supported Belton had
second thoughts in Thornton. Justice O’Connor, for example, in her oneparagraph partial concurrence wrote, “[L]ower court decisions seem now to
treat the ability to search a vehicle incident to the arrest of a recent
occupant as a police entitlement rather than as an exception justified by the
twin rationales of Chimel v. California. That erosion is a direct
consequence of Belton’s shaky foundation.”217
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Ginsburg, concurred only in the
judgment.218 He concluded that Belton could not be squared with
Chimel.219 The Belton rule could only be retained, he argued, by adopting
as follows:
When petitioner’s car was searched in this case, he was neither in, nor
anywhere near, the passenger compartment of his vehicle. Rather, he was
handcuffed and secured in the back of the officer’s squad car. The risk that he
would nevertheless “grab a weapon or evidentiary ite[m]” from his car was remote
in the extreme.
Id. at 625 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (alteration in original).
213 See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981).
214 See Thornton, 541 U.S. at 622.
215 Id. at 622–23.
216 Id. at 623–24 (footnote omitted).
217 Id. at 624 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part) (citation omitted).
218 Id. at 625 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
219 Id. at 629–31.
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the broader Rabinowitz approach to searches incident to arrest and limiting
its application to cars (which have a lesser expectation of privacy).220
Justice Scalia also suggested that Robinson—under which any arrest
justifies a search—was wrongly decided.221
The end result is that the Court has created a rule for searches incident
to arrests made near cars that is as arbitrary and confusing as the
automobile exception. Confusion abounds when rules are established
without foundations.
III. Some Basic Principles
This article is not just about cars. Its goal is to demonstrate how
principled decision making can simultaneously enhance Fourth
Amendment protections and provide guidance to law enforcement officials
without making the Fourth Amendment the Internal Revenue Code of
criminal procedure. Because the Amendment controls two types of
government intrusions upon individuals—seizures and searches—it may be
useful to consider what basic principles the Court ought to establish clearly
as to each. Before examining these principles, there is a preliminary point
to be made.
A.

Consensual Versus Nonconsensual Activity

The preliminary point is that law enforcement officers and other
government agents are as entitled to ask an individual to consent to, permit,
or engage in a particular activity as any nongovernmental person. Because
anyone can walk up to another person and ask, “May I talk to you?” law
enforcement officers may do the same. Although it is unusual, anyone can
contact another person and ask for a tour of the other person’s house. Law
enforcement officials may do the same. In theory, one person may ask
another for permission to search the other’s person or things, and law
enforcement officers may do the same. Consensual activity is generally
reasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes.222 Reasonable suspicion and
220

Id.
Id. at 631–32.
222 See, e.g., United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 200–01 (2002) (“Even when law
enforcement officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may pose
questions, ask for identification, and request consent to search luggage—provided they do
not induce cooperation by coercive means. If a reasonable person would feel free to
terminate the encounter, then he or she has not been seized.”); Florida v. Rodriguez, 469
U.S. 1, 5–6 (1984) (per curiam) (explaining that asking a suspect to talk in an airport is “the
sort of consensual encounter that implicates no Fourth Amendment interest”); Florida v.
Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983) (plurality opinion) (“[L]aw enforcement officers do not
violate the Fourth Amendment[’s prohibition of unreasonable seizures] by merely
approaching an individual on the street or in another public place, by asking him if he is
willing to answer some questions, [or] by putting questions to him if the person is willing to
listen . . . .”); id. at 523 n.3 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (agreeing with plurality that no
221
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probable cause are not required, nor are warrants.
Because law enforcement officers have authority to engage in conduct
that is not authorized for all people, questions may arise as to whether an
individual has consented or has merely submitted to authority. Only the
latter is governed by the Fourth Amendment.
A far better approach would be for the Court to draw lines that focus
on the actions of law enforcement officers rather than on the beliefs of the
individuals with whom they come in contact. These lines are consistent
with some Supreme Court cases and inconsistent with others, as will
become apparent in the discussion below.
B.

Seizures and Terry Stops

Almost all seizures of persons or property can be broken down into
two categories: seizures pursuant to reasonable suspicion and seizures
pursuant to probable cause. In the case of individuals, these are Terry stops
and arrests.223 In the case of property, all seizures look similar: some are
preliminary to seeking warrants, while others are preliminary to warrantless
searches.
1. When Does a Stop Occur?
The Court’s approach to seizures originated with Justice Stewart’s
plurality opinion in United States v. Mendenhall,224 and in Justice White’s
plurality opinion in Florida v. Royer.225 A seizure of an individual occurs,
according to the plurality in Mendenhall, when a reasonable person would
not feel free to terminate an encounter.226 Justice Kennedy’s opinion for
the Court in United States v. Drayton227 stated the same rule in converse
form: “If a reasonable person would feel free to terminate the encounter,
then he or she has not been seized.”228 Stated either way, the test focuses
on reasonable people and their feelings.
The Court focused on what a reasonable person would feel under the
circumstances. The problem with such a focus is that reasonable people
may not feel free to terminate any encounter with the police because they
may not know and are not told that they have a right to terminate an
encounter.229 Thus, what an officer might regard as a request for
seizure occurred when the detectives first approached and questioned the suspect).
223 See supra Part I.B.
224 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
225 Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
226 Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554 (plurality opinion).
227 United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002).
228 Id. at 201.
229 Then–Associate Justice Rehnquist recognized this for the Court in INS v. Delgado,
466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984) (“While most citizens will respond to a police request, the fact
that people do so, and do so without being told they are free not to respond, hardly
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permission may be heard as a command by many individuals.230 Although
an argument could be made that a seizure occurs any time an officer
approaches an individual and does not affirmatively state that the
individual is free at any time to terminate the encounter, the Supreme Court
has rejected this argument in the context of consent searches.231 And there
are good reasons why law enforcement officers should not be required to
discourage individuals from cooperating with them.232
The Court erred by focusing on the hypothetical feelings of a
“reasonable person.” If reasonable people generally do not feel free to
terminate any encounter with officers, they feel “seized” to some extent
from the outset of any encounter. Yet the Court was not prepared to call all
encounters seizures or to require warnings in all encounters. Although the
Court’s holdings suggest that reasonable people feel free to terminate
encounters, surveys among groups of students and judges show
disagreement with the Court’s assessment of reasonable people.233
Furthermore, the holdings are not particularly useful in the long run to law
enforcement officers because they tend to be fact-specific. Giving only
fact-specific guidance, the Court then requires police officers to foresee
accurately how a reasonable person would react and what he or she would
believe, a task which they have no particular ability, education, or training
to accomplish.
2. A Better Approach
A better approach is to focus on the conduct of law enforcement
officers rather than on the reactions of individuals to law enforcement
officers. This approach asks law enforcement officers to pay attention to
their own actions, not to predict how reasonable civilians would respond to
those actions.
Any time that a law enforcement officer uses physical force, threats of
any kind, or physically makes it appear difficult for a person to terminate

eliminates the consensual nature of the response.”).
230 See Daniel J. Steinbock, The Wrong Line Between Freedom and Restraint: The
Unreality, Obscurity, and Incivility of the Fourth Amendment Consensual Encounter
Doctrine, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 507, 535 (2001) (“Far from feeling free to terminate an
encounter, the reasonable person, by all indications, submits to the legitimate and coercive
authority of the police.”).
231 See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 231–32 (1973).
232 See id. (noting that consent searches are standard in police investigatory work and
necessary in order to conduct effective investigations in informal and unstructured
conditions).
233 I frequently ask my students and judges who are participating in discussions of
Fourth Amendment issues for their reactions to the seizure decisions of the Supreme Court.
I find frequent dissent. Their reactions are not surprising given existing social science
research. See Janice Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps and the Psychology of
Coercion, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 153.
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an encounter, courts should say that there has been a seizure.234 If the
Court had followed this approach, it would have decided a number of cases
differently, and it would have enabled law enforcement officers to know
what they cannot do without reasonable suspicion or probable cause.
Drayton is a good example. At a scheduled stop for a Greyhound bus,
the driver permitted three police officers to board the bus as part of a
routine drug and weapons enforcement effort.235 The officers, dressed in
plain clothes, had visible badges and carried concealed weapons.236 Two
officers went to the rear of the bus, while the third officer stayed up front,
kneeling down on the driver’s seat and looking towards the rear.237 One of
the two officers who had gone to the back of the bus walked forward,
asking questions of passengers and seeking to match passengers with their
bags in the overhead racks.238 This officer approached two men, Drayton
and Brown, stuck his face twelve to eighteen inches from Drayton’s face as
he leaned over Drayton’s shoulders, and identified himself as a police
officer doing a drug investigation in a voice both men could hear.239 The
officer asked about Drayton’s luggage, obtained permission to search it, but
found no contraband.240 The officer then asked Brown whether he had any
weapons or drugs and whether he could check Brown’s “person.”241
Brown consented, and during the ensuing pat down, the officer found
drugs.242 Similarly, after obtaining consent from Drayton to search his
person, the officer patted him down and found more drugs.243
The issue before the Court was “‘whether a reasonable person would
feel free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the
encounter.’”244 Justice Kennedy explained that in Florida v. Bostick,245 the
Court adopted this test as more appropriate than the one stated by the
Mendenhall and Royer pluralities for the context of searches on buses:
Bostick first made it clear that for the most part per se rules are
inappropriate in the Fourth Amendment context. The proper
234 The Supreme Court almost said as much in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968):
“Obviously, not all personal intercourse between policemen and citizens involves ‘seizures’
of persons. Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in
some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a ‘seizure’ has occurred.”
Id. at 19 n.16.
235 United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 197 (2002).
236 Id.
237 Id. at 197–98.
238 Id. at 198.
239 Id.
240 Id. at 199.
241 Id.
242 Id.
243 Id.
244 Id. at 202 (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436 (1991).
245 Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991)).
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inquiry necessitates a consideration of “all the circumstances
surrounding the encounter.” The Court noted next that the
traditional rule, which states that a seizure does not occur so long
as a reasonable person would feel free “to disregard the police and
go about his business,” is not an accurate measure of the coercive
effect of a bus encounter. A passenger may not want to get off a
bus if there is a risk it will depart before the opportunity to
reboard. A bus rider’s movements are confined in this sense, but
this is the natural result of choosing to take the bus; it says nothing
about whether the police conduct is coercive.246
In sum, Bostick attempted to frame the question of whether “a
reasonable person would feel free to disregard the police and go about his
business” when an encounter occurs on a bus, while Drayton sought to
answer the question on the facts presented.247
It is certainly arguable that when reasonable people are confronted by
multiple police officers on a bus, some of whom are standing at the front
and rear of the bus while another roams the aisle asking questions of
passengers, many people would not feel free to disregard the officers and
go about their business. Presumably, the officers decided to enter the bus
and take up the positions they did to send a message to the passengers—
i.e., that they were not free to leave. Although the officers stated in court
that they would have let a passenger step off the bus without restriction,248
the message they actually communicated to the passengers was far
different.
When the officers manned the exits, they physically made it appear
difficult for anyone on the bus to terminate the encounter. This should
have been sufficient to make it a seizure. The same result should prevail in
a situation in which an officer closes a door to a room, stands in front of the
door, and then requests a conversation. Making it appear difficult to leave
should be sufficient to constitute a seizure.
This standard for a seizure would have required a different result in
INS v. Delgado.249 In that case, Immigration and Naturalization Service
(“INS”) agents conducted “factory surveys” by entering factories or plants
to look for illegal aliens, with the permission of the factory owners.250
Some agents stationed themselves near the buildings’ exits while others
moved around the factory to question workers.251 The agents had visible

246
247
248
249
250
251

Drayton, 536 U.S. at 201–02 (citations omitted).
Id. at 201 (quotation omitted).
Id. at 198.
INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984).
Id. at 212.
Id.
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weapons, badges, and walkie-talkies.252 Four employees questioned in one
of the surveys filed suit, claiming that they were seized in violation of the
Fourth Amendment.253 Incredibly, the Court concluded that because the
employees were working inside the factory and only faced the possibility of
questioning if they tried to leave, the placement of armed guards at the
doors had no coercive effect.254 This is a strange view of how reasonable
people might react if the exit doors at their workplace were blocked by
armed individuals. Presumably, the doors were manned because the INS
agents thought people might otherwise leave. Law enforcement officers
certainly understand that when they use force, threats, or block normal
means of ingress or egress, they are conducting a seizure. Officers need
not and should not be required to double as psychoanalysts simply to
determine whether their actions constitute a seizure. Yet the Court’s
reasoning in Delgado seems to require this very thing. Officers would have
a much easier time focusing on their own actions.
3. Unsuccessful Attempts
Focusing on the actions of the police rather than on the reactions of
individuals to the police would reinforce the constitutional mandate that
police can never use force or threats in dealing with individuals unless they
satisfy the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Such a focus would
have led to a very different result in a case like California v. Hodari D.255
Hodari D. arose when police officers encountered a group of youths
huddled around a car who fled when they saw the officers.256 Hodari, one
of the fleeing youths, threw away a small rock as a pursuing officer was
about to catch him.257 The officer tackled Hodari, handcuffed him, and
discovered that the discarded rock was crack cocaine.258 The only issue
before the Court was whether Hodari had been seized when he saw the
officer running towards him and subsequently dropped the cocaine.259
Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court distinguished between two types
of seizures: those in which the officer has physically touched a person in an
effort to restrain the person, and those in which the arrestee has submitted
to an officer’s nonphysical show of authority.260 With respect to physicaltouching seizures, Justice Scalia wrote, “To constitute an arrest . . . —the
quintessential ‘seizure of the person’ under our Fourth Amendment
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260

Id.
Id. at 213.
Id. at 218–19.
California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991).
Id. at 622–23.
Id. at 623.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 624–26.

1742

The George Washington Law Review

[Vol. 74:1702

jurisprudence—the mere grasping or application of physical force with
lawful authority, whether or not it succeeded in subduing the arrestee, was
sufficient.”261
Applying this test in Hodari D., Justice Scalia’s reasoning suggested
that if the officer had touched Hodari (i.e., seized him) before Hodari threw
the cocaine, there would have been a seizure and the evidence would have
been suppressed.262 Justice Scalia also noted, however, that at some point
the effects of an unsuccessful attempt to arrest dissipate:
To say that an arrest is effected by the slightest application of
physical force, despite the arrestee’s escape, is not to say that for
Fourth Amendment purposes there is a continuing arrest during
the period of fugitivity. If, for example, [the officer] had laid his
hands upon Hodari to arrest him, but Hodari had broken away and
had then cast away the cocaine, it would hardly be realistic to say
that that disclosure had been made during the course of an
arrest.263
As for nonphysical seizures, Justice Scalia reasoned that the
Mendenhall “free to leave” test264 was a necessary, but not a dispositive,
test for determining whether a seizure has occurred.265 He concluded that a
person is not seized when she is not touched and does not submit to police
action, even though reasonable persons would not feel free to resist:
The word “seizure” readily bears the meaning of a laying on of
hands or application of physical force to restrain movement, even
when it is ultimately unsuccessful. (“She seized the pursesnatcher, but he broke out of her grasp.”) It does not remotely
apply, however, to the prospect of a policeman yelling “Stop, in
the name of the law!” at a fleeing form that continues to flee.
That is no seizure.266
In the footnote accompanying this quote, Justice Scalia described and
dismissed the English-common-law prohibition on unlawful attempted
seizures:
261 Id. at 624–25 (citing Whitehead v. Keyes, 85 Mass. (3 Allen) 495, 501 (1862)
(“[A]n officer effects an arrest of a person whom he has authority to arrest, by laying his
hand on him for the purpose of arresting him, though he may not succeed in stopping and
holding him.”)); see also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 41 cmt. h (1934); ASHER L.
CORNELIUS, THE LAW OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE 163–64 (2d ed. 1930).
262 See Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 625.
263 Id. Whether or not Justice Scalia is correct in saying that it would not be realistic to
assume that a toss following an escape does not occur during an arrest, the toss still might be
the fruit of an arrest attempt.
264 See supra text accompanying note 226.
265 Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 628 (citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554
(1980))..
266 Id. at 626 (footnote omitted).
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For this simple reason—which involves neither “logicchopping,” nor any arcane knowledge of legal history—it is
irrelevant that English law proscribed “an unlawful attempt to take
a presumptively innocent person into custody.” We have
consulted the common law to explain the meaning of seizure—
and, contrary to the dissent’s portrayal, to expand rather than
contract that meaning (since one would not normally think that the
mere touching of a person would suffice). But neither usage nor
common-law tradition makes an attempted seizure a seizure. The
common law may have made an attempted seizure unlawful in
certain circumstances; but it made many things unlawful, very few
of which were elevated to constitutional proscriptions.267
It seems that the English common law made perfect sense, much more
so than Justice Scalia. Consider again a physical touching. If, in fact, an
officer grabbed a person and had control of her, no one would doubt that a
seizure occurred. If the person broke away, reasonable people would
conclude that an escape from a seizure had been accomplished. Suppose,
however, an officer sought to grab a suspect, tripped, and brushed a finger
against the suspect as the suspect began to run. No one would say that the
suspect had been seized in any normal understanding of a physical seizure,
but as the Court appropriately interprets the Fourth Amendment, such a
slight touching would constitute a seizure.268 Why? The answer is that no
person should be put at risk of the use of force or threats unless
constitutional standards are satisfied.
Now, say that the officer tripped before his finger touched the suspect,
but the officer yelled, “Stop or I’ll shoot!” After taking one step as if to
flee, the suspect dropped dead of a heart attack. Following his opinion in
Hodari D., Justice Scalia would reason that no seizure had taken place, and
thus the officer had taken no action that falls within the ambit of the Fourth
Amendment.269 This makes no sense. Whether or not suspects submit to
official demands, the Fourth Amendment still controls what law
enforcement officers may do. Law enforcement officers who seek to put
suspects at risk should be within the reach of the Fourth Amendment.
Apparently, Justice Scalia would hold that if an officer shot at a
suspect to stop him from fleeing, but the bullet missed the suspect because
he lunged away to avoid being shot, there would be no seizure. There is
little logic to the result that the touch of a finger that fails to restrain a
suspect is a seizure, while an unsuccessful attempt to shoot a suspect is not.
The common-law prohibition on unlawful attempted seizures, on the
267

Id. at 626 n.2 (citations omitted).
If the suspect subsequently ran away after being touched, he would no longer be
seized, although the initial seizure still would have occurred. See id. at 625.
269 See id. at 626.
268
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other hand, had the right focus. Hodari D. adopted the common law with
respect to physical touching seizures, i.e., the mere touching of a suspect is
a seizure, even if wholly ineffective in controlling the suspect.270 The
common law recognized, as a properly interpreted Fourth Amendment
should, that police who attempt to use force or threats should be judged
according to whether they had sufficient cause to do so, not whether they
succeeded in actually touching or apprehending the suspect. Whether or
not they succeeded may determine the harm actually visited on individuals
who are wrongly seized, but it should not affect the determination of the
legality of the police action.271
4. Reasonable Suspicion: A Necessary Ingredient
Absent the minimal showing of reasonable suspicion, no use of force
or threats should be permitted under the Fourth Amendment. This is the
lesson of Terry v. Ohio and its progeny.272 No exceptions or “bright line”
rules should be permitted to confuse this basic constitutional requirement.
Thus, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion for the Court in Muehler v.
Mena,273 written in his final term as Chief Justice, should not stand the test
of time.
This case arose when police detained Iris Mena in handcuffs during a
search of the premises that she and several others occupied.274 Police had
reason to believe that a gang member, who was armed and dangerous and
recently involved in a shooting, lived on the premises.275 A SWAT team
was used to execute a search warrant in the early morning hours.276 Mena
and three other handcuffed individuals were taken to a converted garage,
where they were kept while the search was conducted.277 Mena filed a civil

270

Id. at 625. Justice Scalia attempted to reconcile a discrepancy between dictionaries
and the common law regarding the definition of “seizure”: “From the time of the founding
to the present, the word ‘seizure’ has meant a ‘taking possession.’” Id. (citations omitted)
(referring to definitions from three dictionaries dated 1828, 1856, and 1981). A touching is
clearly not the same as “taking possession.” Yet a touching, according to Fourth
Amendment Supreme Court jurisprudence, is a seizure.
271 To constitute action that is regulated by the Fourth Amendment, police conduct
must involve a deliberate attempt to stop a person, as Justice Scalia concluded for the Court
in Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 599 (1989). An officer who slips on ice and
falls accidentally on another person may have stopped and even seized the person, but not
for Fourth Amendment purposes. Such is not the use of force or a threat to compel a person
to halt; it is an accident.
272 This line of cases is well summarized in Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 697–
701 (1981). See infra text accompanying notes 284–301.
273 Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93 (2005).
274 Id. at 95.
275 Id.
276 Id. at 96.
277 Id.
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rights action against the police.278 A jury found that two officers violated
the Fourth Amendment by using greater force than was reasonable and for
a longer period than was reasonable, and awarded Mena $20,000 in actual
damages and $40,000 in punitive damages.279 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment for Mena.280 The
court reviewed the denial of qualified immunity de novo,281 and held that
the detention of Mena violated the Fourth Amendment because it was
objectively unreasonable to confine her in the converted garage and to keep
her in handcuffs during the search.282 The court further held that the
officers should have released Mena as soon as it became clear that she
posed no immediate threat.283
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion rejected the reasoning of the Ninth
Circuit as he relied upon Michigan v. Summers284 as controlling
authority.285 In Summers, police officers in Detroit were preparing to
execute a search warrant at a house to look for narcotics when they
encountered Summers coming down the front steps.286 They asked him to
assist them in entering the house, detained him while they conducted their
search, and arrested and searched him after they found narcotics in the
basement and ascertained that he owned the house.287 In conducting the
search of his person, the police also found heroin in his coat pocket.288
Justice Stevens’s opinion for the Court noted that the State’s argument
that the search warrant authorized a search of individuals in the house, even
if true, could not sustain the detention of Summers because he was not
actually in the house when the police arrived to execute the warrant.289
Justice Stevens then spent a good deal of effort distinguishing Summers
from Dunaway v. New York290 and establishing that the intrusion on

278

Id.
Id. at 97.
280 Mena v. City of Simi Valley, 332 F.3d 1255, 1270 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated and
remanded sub nom. Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93 (2005).
281 Id. at 1261 n.2.
282 Id. at 1263–64.
283 Id. at 1263. Other parts of the court’s opinion, which shall not be discussed here,
include, e.g., whether the questioning of Mena about her immigration status constituted an
independent Fourth Amendment violation. See id. at 1264–66.
284 Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
285 Mena, 544 U.S. at 98 (citing Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981)).
286 Summers, 452 U.S. at 693.
287 Id. The officers detained eight other individuals in the house, whose detentions
were not at issue in this case. Id. at 693 n.1.
288 Id. at 693.
289 Id. at 694.
290 Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979) (holding that police violated the
Fourth Amendment when they took a murder suspect into custody without a warrant or
probable cause and questioned him in an interrogation room at the police station).
279
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Summers was not the equivalent of an arrest requiring probable cause.291
He reasoned as follows:
In assessing the justification for the detention of an occupant of
premises being searched for contraband pursuant to a valid
warrant, both the law enforcement interest and the nature of the
“articulable facts” supporting the detention are relevant. Most
obvious is the legitimate law enforcement interest in preventing
flight in the event that incriminating evidence is found. Less
obvious, but sometimes of greater importance, is the interest in
minimizing the risk of harm to the officers. Although no special
danger to the police is suggested by the evidence in this record,
the execution of a warrant to search for narcotics is the kind of
transaction that may give rise to sudden violence or frantic efforts
to conceal or destroy evidence. The risk of harm to both the
police and the occupants is minimized if the officers routinely
exercise unquestioned command of the situation. Finally, the
orderly completion of the search may be facilitated if the
occupants of the premises are present. Their self-interest may
induce them to open locked doors or locked containers to avoid
the use of force that is not only damaging to property but may also
delay the completion of the task at hand.292
The crucial language in the above quote has been emphasized. Justice
Stevens added another explanation:
The existence of a search warrant . . . also provides an objective
justification for the detention. A judicial officer has determined
that police have probable cause to believe that someone in the
home is committing a crime. Thus a neutral magistrate rather than
an officer in the field has made the critical determination that the
police should be given a special authorization to thrust themselves
into the privacy of a home. The connection of an occupant to that
home gives the police officer an easily identifiable and certain
basis for determining that suspicion of criminal activity justifies a
detention of that occupant.293
The language quoted thus far is based on simple logic: if the police
have probable cause to search a home for contraband, it is reasonable to
suspect that anyone residing in the home might be subject to arrest if the
contraband is found. Thus, detaining those persons is reasonable under the
Terry line of cases.
Unfortunately, Justice Stevens added more than was necessary to

291
292
293

Summers, 452 U.S. at 697–98, 701–02.
Id. at 702–03 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
Id. at 703–04 (footnote omitted).
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decide the case:
If the evidence that a citizen’s residence is harboring contraband is
sufficient to persuade a judicial officer that an invasion of the
citizen’s privacy is justified, it is constitutionally reasonable to
require that citizen to remain while officers of the law execute a
valid warrant to search his home. Thus, for Fourth Amendment
purposes, we hold that a warrant to search for contraband founded
on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to
detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is
conducted.294
In two of the footnotes accompanying this text, Justice Stevens added that
“[w]e do not decide whether the same result would be justified if the search
warrant merely authorized a search for evidence,”295 and “[a]lthough
special circumstances, or possibly a prolonged detention, might lead to a
different conclusion in an unusual case, we are persuaded that this routine
detention of residents of a house while it was being searched for
contraband pursuant to a valid warrant is not such a case.”296
In Mena, the police searched for evidence of guns and gang
membership paraphernalia associated with a particular individual.297 The
officers executing the warrant found a .22 caliber handgun, ammunition,
and some evidence of gang membership.298 Having found this, they did not
arrest Mena because they never had reason to suspect her of involvement
with the gang (the search warrant for the premises was issued based on
reasonable suspicion of another resident of the house).299 Thus, three
issues that were not decided in Summers were before the Court in Mena:
(1) Where the police are looking for evidence directed at a particular
individual, may they detain others on the premises while they execute a
search warrant, absent any articulable facts suggesting that, if they found
evidence, they would arrest the detained people? (2) Does Summers apply
to a search for evidence other than drugs or other contraband? (3) Does
Summers apply to a situation where a person, as to whom there is no
reasonable suspicion, is handcuffed for more than two hours?
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion for the Court in Mena assumed that
Summers had decided all of these questions and adopted a per se rule
applicable to all searches of premises: “An officer’s authority to detain
incident to a search is categorical; it does not depend on the ‘quantum of
proof justifying detention or the extent of the intrusion to be imposed by
294
295
296
297
298
299

Id. at 704–05 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 705 n.20.
Id. at 705 n.21.
Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 95–96 (2005).
Id. at 96.
Id.
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the seizure.’”300 Although Rehnquist’s rule quoted language from Justice
Stevens’s opinion in Summers, it ignored the fact that Summers involved
contraband with which everyone on the premises could reasonably be
suspected of involvement, did not decide whether its reasoning would
apply to a search for noncontraband evidence, and left open the question of
whether special circumstances such as a prolonged detention (or handcuffs
perhaps?)301 might require a different result.
Perhaps the biggest step that the Court took in Mena was to substitute
the word “occupant” for “resident” in applying the per se rule.302 The
Chief Justice’s opinion in Mena authorizes an automatic seizure, including
the use of reasonable force, upon anyone occupying any premises when a
search warrant is executed upon that premises.303 There is no longer any
recognition that different circumstances might require a different result.
Consider the implications. Suppose that police officers have a search
warrant to search a house for a gun belonging to X. They arrive and
discover that a Lamaze birthing class is being conducted in a den by X’s
spouse. According to Mena, the officers executing the warrant have a per
se right to detain all of the pregnant mothers-to-be and their coaches while
the warrant is executed. This is indefensible.
Change the Lamaze class to a scout troop meeting. Whether it is Boy
Scouts, Girl Scouts, Eagle Scouts, or some combination, there is nothing
reasonable about a per se rule that the scouts and the scout masters can be
detained pending a search. This is also indefensible.
Putting aside pregnant women, coaches, scouts, and scout masters, one
can imagine a reading discussion group, a Bible study class, or any number
of activities in which people occupy premises in which it is implausible to
regard their detention during the execution of a search warrant as
reasonable.
It makes more sense to instruct police that, pursuant to Terry, while
300

Id. at 98 (quoting Summers, 452 U.S. at 705 n.19).
The Chief Justice recognized that the use of the handcuffs was a greater intrusion
than in Summers. Id. at 99.
302 It is of paramount importance that in Summers, the suspect was a resident of the
house that was the subject of the search warrant. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 693
(1981). The police knew that the suspect lived in the home prior to the search. Id. at 695
n.4. Furthermore, Justice Stevens strongly and repeatedly emphasized the importance of the
fact that the suspect lived at the premises: “If the evidence that a citizen’s residence is
harboring contraband is sufficient to persuade a judicial officer that an invasion of the
citizen’s privacy is justified, it is constitutionally reasonable to require that citizen to remain
while officers of the law execute a valid warrant to search his home.” Id. at 704–05. Thus,
although Justice Stevens did use the words “resident” and “occupant” interchangeably at
times, the context of the case, plus his repeated emphasis on the importance of the suspect’s
resident status, clearly demonstrates that the two words were intended to convey the same
thing, i.e., that the suspect resided at the premises being searched. This emphasis
disappeared in Mena.
303 Mena, 544 U.S. at 98.
301
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executing a search warrant, they may detain anyone at the premises who is
reasonably likely to be arrested if the evidence being sought is found. That
is what Summers was all about. The Court has frequently indicated that
when drugs are found in a place that is shared by several people, all of
them may be arrested.304 That is why the detention in Summers made
sense. Expanding Summers to all searches, regardless of what is sought or
who is an occupant of the premises, is unwarranted.305
5. Why and for How Long Stops Are Permitted
The power to stop an individual pursuant to Terry and other cases is
intended to provide the police with a brief opportunity to ascertain whether
they have probable cause to arrest or issue a citation for a crime or
violation of the law. The Terry doctrine recognizes that law enforcement
officers cannot always know instantaneously whether a crime has been
committed or is about to be committed. The power to stop permits officers
to “freeze the scene” in order to make the probable cause determination.
Without such power, law enforcement officers might well have to make
premature arrests in order to protect society or risk having criminals escape
or commit crimes that could have been prevented.
The Court has made clear that stops are permissible only for limited
periods. It has not set a time limit, but police by now understand that they
can freeze the scene for only a little while and must then make a decision of
whether to arrest (or cite) a person or let the person go. In United States v.

304 See, e.g., Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S.
454, 455–56 (1981) (four individuals arrested when marijuana found in car). Justice
Rehnquist wrote for the Court in Pringle as it upheld the arrest of three occupants of a car in
which cocaine and money were found. Pringle, 540 U.S. at 369. Two of the men were
released after Pringle confessed, which is a reminder that probable cause to arrest is not an
indication of sufficient evidence to convict. Id.
305 In Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979), the Court refused to uphold a frisk of a
bar patron who happened to be present when the police arrived to conduct a search of the
bar pursuant to a valid search warrant. Id. at 88–89, 96. The search warrant authorized a
search of the bar and the bartender for narcotics. Id. at 88. The Court held that officers
needed to have specific facts suggesting that Ybarra was armed and dangerous in order to
frisk him. Id. at 93. Justice Stewart’s opinion observed that “[a]lthough the search warrant,
issued upon probable cause, gave the officers authority to search the premises and to search
‘Greg [the bartender],’ it gave them no authority whatever to invade the constitutional
protections possessed individually by the tavern’s customers.” Id. at 92. These
constitutional protections included the right to be free from seizure as well as from searches
(i.e., frisking), absent reasonable suspicion. Id. at 91. Then–Associate Justice Rehnquist
joined Chief Justice Burger’s dissenting opinion. Id. at 96 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Justice Rehnquist also wrote his own dissent, in which the Chief Justice and Justice
Blackmun joined. Id. at 98 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist argued for the
same kind of per se rule that ultimately was adopted in Mena: “Because the police were
aware that heroin was being offered for sale in the tavern, it was quite reasonable to assume
that any one or more of the persons at the bar could have been involved in drug trafficking.”
Id. at 106.

1750

The George Washington Law Review

[Vol. 74:1702

Place,306 the Court held that a ninety-minute detention of Place’s luggage,
which also delayed Place, was unreasonable.307 Police used the time to
bring the luggage from one metropolitan airport to another, where a drug
sniffing dog was present.308 Justice O’Connor’s opinion reasoned that the
officers had not diligently pursued their investigation and commented that
“we have never approved a seizure of the person for the prolonged
[ninety]-minute period involved here.”309
In United States v. Sharpe,310 the Court held that a twenty-minute
delay between stopping a car and arresting its occupant was reasonable
under the circumstances.311 The Court found that the suspect bore much of
the responsibility for the delay as a result of his flight and failure to pull
over as requested.312
The Court wisely emphasized that law enforcement officers utilizing
their Terry powers must act diligently: “[W]e consider it appropriate to
examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that
was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time
it was necessary to detain the defendant.”313
Diligent police action usually means detaining a suspect for a short
time in order to decide whether to arrest or cite the suspect. When police
conduct a search for contraband, as in Summers and Mena,314 and they have
reasonable suspicion to believe that a person on the premises would be
subject to arrest if the contraband is found, detaining the suspect until the
search is completed may constitute diligent police action even though the
detention is longer than most Terry stops.
Terry seizures of property, approved first in Van Leeuwen,315 are
indistinguishable from seizures of persons when the property seizure
effectively detains the person possessing the property as in Place.316 The
306

United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
Id. at 710.
308 Id. at 699.
309 Id. at 709–10.
310 United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985).
311 Id. at 688.
312 Id. at 687–88.
313 Id. at 686.
314 Summers and Mena involved searches conducted pursuant to warrants.
See
Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 693 (1981); Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 95–96
(2005). There is no reason to believe, however, that in exigent circumstances when police
are permitted to search without a warrant for contraband, a different result would obtain
with respect to persons found on the premises who are subject to arrest if the contraband is
found.
315 See supra text accompanying notes 38–40.
316 See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 708–09 (1983) (noting that because the
detention of a traveler’s luggage subjects the traveler to the possible disruption of his
schedule and the inconvenience of either staying with his luggage or tracking it down, the
same limitations that apply to Terry stops of individuals apply to investigative detentions of
307
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permissible length of a detention of property in such circumstances equals
the permissible length that a person may be detained.317
Where, however, property is detained without the possessor’s
knowledge, as in Van Leeuwen, a detention may exceed the time that a
person can be detained. In Van Leeuwen, a unanimous Supreme Court
approved of the detention of a mailed package for more than a day.318
Lower courts have upheld seizures of mail that lasted for three days,319 but
have also invalidated long seizures where the police failed to act
diligently.320
The purpose of a Van Leeuwen–type detention is the same as the
purpose of detaining a person: i.e., to permit law enforcement to decide
whether there is probable cause for a full seizure and search. The
requirement in all detentions is that police act diligently. But thus far, the
cases suggest that detentions of people will only be tolerated for short
periods of time, while detentions of property that do not effectively detain
people may be for longer periods.
The Supreme Court has not addressed very many property detention
cases. In the future, it may have to decide whether the diligence
requirement limits the amount of time that property may be detained,
especially if law enforcement is aware that the failure of such property to
arrive at its destination on time may result in substantial damage to the
recipient. The Court might also have to decide, with respect to both
individuals and property, whether a prolonged detention might be
reasonable if the investigation involved a major threat to public safety or
national security, such as a possible terrorist attack.321 It would make sense
for the Court to hold that detentions of property may become unreasonable
if law enforcement detains them for a somewhat lengthy period, with the
knowledge that a delay in delivery threatens to cause substantial injury to
the recipient of the property. Furthermore, it would make sense for the
Court to hold that detentions of both persons and property may be extended
when the probable cause inquiry involves a great threat to public safety or
national security.

luggage as well).
317 Id.
318 United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 253 (1970).
319 See, e.g., United States v. Aldaz, 921 F.2d 227, 231 (9th Cir. 1990).
320 See, e.g., United States v. Dass, 849 F.2d 414, 415 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that the
detention of mail for seven to twenty-three days was unreasonable where diligent police
action could have reduced the detention to thirty-six hours).
321 Cf. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 273–74 (2000) (holding that an anonymous tip
that a person is carrying a gun is not sufficient to justify a stop and frisk, but also noting that
“a report of a person carrying a bomb need [not] bear the indicia of reliability we demand
for a report of a person carrying a firearm before the police can constitutionally conduct a
frisk”).
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Arrests

1. Why Are Arrests Made?
The discussion of temporary seizures above reveals that they are made
to give officers an opportunity to decide whether they have probable cause
to arrest or cite, or to seek to obtain a search warrant. But why are arrests
made?
One answer is that the arrest is the initiation of a criminal process.
Yet, an arrest is not required to initiate that process. Issuance of a citation
or summons charging an offense and requiring a person to appear before a
magistrate is an alternative. For example, Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 4(a) provides in relevant part:
If the complaint or one or more affidavits filed with the complaint
establish probable cause to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the defendant committed it, the judge must
issue an arrest warrant to an officer authorized to execute it. At
the request of an attorney for the government, the judge must issue
a summons, instead of a warrant, to a person authorized to serve
it.322
In many places, law enforcement officers have the authority to issue a
citation or summons in lieu of making an arrest.323 If the only reason for an
arrest were to initiate the criminal process, an arrest might seem an
unreasonable seizure given the availability of an adequate, less intrusive
substitute.
An additional reason for arrest is to assure that a person is properly
identified. The booking process usually involves taking a photograph and
fingerprinting a suspect. But custodial arrests are not actually required to
assure proper identification. An officer issuing a summons or citation
could take a photograph and even obtain fingerprints.324 Moreover, it is
doubtful that most individuals with driver’s licenses and other forms of
identification are carrying false identification, which itself may be a
crime.325 If identification were the justification for arrest, arrest might
again seem like an unreasonable seizure given the availability of an
adequate, less intrusive substitute.
322 FED. R. CRIM. P. 4(a). Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 4(b)(2) provides that
“[a] summons must be in the same form as a warrant except that it must require the
defendant to appear before a magistrate judge at a stated time and place.”
323 See, e.g., Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 263 (1973) (noting that police
regulations did not require that a minor-traffic-law violator be taken into custody).
324 See Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 816 (1985) (leaving open the possibility that
fingerprinting in the field based on reasonable suspicion might be permissible).
325 To the extent that police want to be sure that there are no outstanding warrants
against people who are detained, they can run a background check before deciding to issue a
summons or citation. Arrests are not necessary to perform these checks.
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There are two other valid reasons why police officers arrest suspects.
One is to prevent escape and thereby to assure that the suspect will appear
for trial. Given the enormous number of statutes that penalize conduct in
this day and age, there is reason to question whether escape is really a
threat when offenders are charged with traffic or other minor offenses. If
the penalty for failure to appear is set high enough, minor offenders have a
great incentive to make court appearances.
Another valid reason for arrest is to remove dangerous individuals
from situations in which they may threaten society and permit a magistrate
to decide whether these individuals should be released pending trial and on
what grounds. The arrest of dangerous individuals not only protects the
safety of the public, but it makes the public aware that law enforcement
officials believe that a threat has been removed and that the public need not
continue to fear the presence of a particular offender in the community.
However, it seems obvious that not all individuals pose such a danger to
society that their isolation, even for a brief period, is necessary.
These valid reasons for arrest apply to some suspects, but not to all.
Many people who are arrested for minor crimes could easily be processed
with a summons or citation. Why, then, do we continue to arrest them? At
one time, a writ of attachment could even issue in a civil case for the
seizure of the defendant unless adequate bail was posted.326 Few would
think the arrest of a defendant in a civil case would be reasonable today.
There are practical reasons why law enforcement officers make arrests
when circumstances do not require taking individuals into custody. These
reasons ought to be invalid under a “reasonable” interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement.
Before identifying these reasons, it is important to identify the ordeal
entailed in a custodial arrest. Typically, the suspect is handcuffed, fully
searched incident to arrest, placed while handcuffed in the back seat of a
patrol car, taken to a police station, booked (photographed and
fingerprinted), placed in a holding cell, and after some time passes (which
might be forty-eight hours if the arrest is on a weekend327) taken before a
326 See, e.g., The Robert W. Parsons, 191 U.S. 17, 37 (1903) (comparing in personam
jurisdiction, where a warrant of arrest could be issued for the defendant, with in rem
jurisdiction, where the defendant’s possessions could be attached); Palmer v. Allen, 11 U.S.
(7 Cranch) 550, 551 (1813) (noting that in an action for trespass, assault and battery, and
false imprisonment, the plaintiff attached the body of the defendant); see also Albright v.
Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 278 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (noting that the purpose of an
arrest at common law, both in criminal and civil cases, was to ensure the arrestee’s
appearance in court).
327 The Supreme Court created a rebuttable presumption that it is reasonable for the
police to arrest a suspect without a warrant for up to forty-eight hours before a magistrate
makes a probable cause determination. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S.
44, 56–57 (1991). The holding deals only with the probable cause determination. It says
nothing about how long a person may be detained following an arrest for a minor offense

1754

The George Washington Law Review

[Vol. 74:1702

magistrate who determines whether to release the person and on what
conditions. While in a holding cell, the suspect may be housed with career
criminals, sociopaths, and/or other extremely dangerous individuals.
Assaults, physical and sexual, are a genuine danger. Despite the realities
associated with custodial arrests, most courts, including the Supreme Court,
seem oblivious to exactly what occurs in an arrest scenario.
Law enforcement officers understand what happens to a custodial
arrestee. They know when they make an arrest of any offender who they
have the power to take into custody that by making a custodial arrest, they
are able to serve as judge, jury, and sentencer as well as officer of the law.
They know this because whatever time an arrestee spends in a jail cell
following a lawful arrest is deemed lawful incarceration, even if the law
that the arrestee broke was punishable only by a fine.328
Put another way, in some circumstances a law enforcement officer can
unilaterally determine to arrest rather than issue a summons or citation and
can do so for the purpose of punishing the person arrested. Arresting
someone for such a purpose must be deemed improper in any system in
which suspects are presumed innocent and punishment is a decision for
judges or juries. A related reason for arrest is to humiliate the arrestee by
subjecting her to the “perp walk,” where the arrestee is deliberately
marched before the news media so that she can be photographed and
publicly displayed.329 If the purpose of publicity were only to assure the
public that law enforcement officials believe that a danger to the
community has been removed, the arrest and ensuing publicity both could
be justified. But to the extent that the public aspects of the arrest are meant
to humiliate, the humiliation is a form of punishment that is as
objectionable as the arrest itself.330
before a release decision is made. In most instances, however, the magistrate who makes
the probable cause determination also makes a release decision. Indeed, that is why a
majority of the Court in McLaughlin was willing to give jurisdictions the forty-eight hour
leeway—i.e., so that the probable cause determination could be combined with other
proceedings. Id.
328 See, e.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354–55 (2001) (holding that
there was no Fourth Amendment violation for the custodial arrest of a woman following a
seat-belt violation that was punishable by a $25–$50 fine).
329 See, e.g., The Perp Walk, BUS. WK., Jan. 13, 2003, at 86. The term “perp walk” has
a dictionary definition: “The deliberate escorting of an arrested suspect by police in front of
news media, esp. as a means of pressuring or humiliating the suspect.” The American
Heritage College Dictionary 1038 (4th ed. 2002).
330 In Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 612–13 (1999), the Court recognized that a desire
to publicize law enforcement efforts is not sufficient to justify permitting media personnel to
accompany police when a search warrant is executed. The Court expressed concern about
intruding into residential privacy. Id. It is ironic that, although the Court proclaimed in
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967), that “the Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places,” the Court has failed to protect people against unnecessary arrests. In
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), Chief Justice Warren described the Fourth Amendment as
a protection of personal security as he wrote, “This inestimable right of personal security
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Another practical reason that law enforcement officers arrest people is
because they get the benefit of the “free” or automatic search incident to
arrest that has been discussed above.331 If they issue a summons or
citation, they do not get to make the search.332 If there is no valid reason to
make an arrest, it should not be permitted in order to enable the police to
search. The justification for a search incident to arrest presumes there is a
valid reason to arrest in the first place. There is no reasonable basis for
subjecting an individual to an arrest and a subsequent search if there is no
reason to arrest to begin with.
The final practical reason why law enforcement officers like to make
arrests is that an arrest gives them an opportunity to engage in custodial
interrogation.333 But like a search incident to arrest, custodial interrogation
is another burden imposed upon an arrestee. If an arrest is unwarranted,
such an additional onus ought also to be regarded as unreasonable.334
2. Arrests for Minor Offenses
Justice Stewart suggested in a concurring opinion in Gustafson v.
Florida335 that a “persuasive claim might have been made in this case that
the custodial arrest of the petitioner for a minor traffic offense violated his
rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.”336 The Supreme
Court rejected such a claim in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista.337
belongs as much to the citizen on the streets of our cities as to the homeowner closeted in
his study to dispose of his secret affairs.” Id. at 8–9 . Yet, the person is not protected
against unreasonable arrests.
331 See supra Part II.
332 In Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998), Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for a
unanimous Court as it held that a “search incident to citation” is impermissible. Id. at 118–
19.
333 See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (enacting procedural
safeguards to ensure compliance with the Fifth Amendment during police interrogations
following arrests).
334 A new motivation to search may emerge if Congress approves a proposed Senate
bill allowing federal authorities to collect and maintain DNA samples of arrestees. See
Jonathan Krim, Bill Would Permit DNA Collection from All Those Arrested, WASH. POST,
Sept. 24, 2005, at A3. An argument also might be made that fingerprints and/or DNA
records should be kept of all individuals in the United States to aid in identification in case
of emergency. See generally Alan Zarembo, Morgue Stands Ready To Give Names to the
Dead, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2005, at A19 (describing the difficulty of identifying dead bodies
in the wake of Hurricane Katrina). Whether or not this need outweighs privacy concerns,
any such proposal would seek to impose a uniform burden on all individuals. As a result,
the political process ought to assure that all voices are heard. Using arrests to generate
DNA samples would mean that only those individuals who are singled out for arrests will be
burdened. The political process is less likely to work, particularly if the burden falls heavily
on the poor and the disenfranchised.
335 Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
336 Id. at 266–67 (Stevens, J., concurring).
337 Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
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Gail Atwater was driving her pickup truck in Lago Vista, Texas, when
a police officer pulled her over after he saw her three-year-old son and fiveyear-old daughter in the front seat not wearing seatbelts.338 The officer had
stopped Atwater previously when he thought she had not belted in her son,
but discovered that the child was in fact belted although in a position that
Atwater conceded was unsafe.339 After the second stop, the officer called
for backup and asked Atwater for her license and insurance
documentation.340 She had none and explained that her purse had been
stolen the day before.341 The officer arrested Atwater, handcuffed her,
placed her in his patrol car, and drove her to the station house where she
was booked and placed in a cell before being released by a magistrate on a
$310 bond.342 Atwater pleaded no contest to a seatbelt violation charge and
paid a $50 fine.343 She then filed a civil rights suit against the officer, the
city, and the chief of police, claiming that the arrest was a violation of the
Fourth Amendment.344
After a district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, a
panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed,
holding that “an arrest for a first-time seat belt offense” was an
unreasonable seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.345 The
en banc court reversed the panel and reinstated the summary judgment.346
The Supreme Court agreed with the en banc Fifth Circuit and rejected
what Justice Souter characterized as “Atwater’s specific contention [] that
‘founding-era common-law rules’ forbade peace officers to make
warrantless misdemeanor arrests except in cases of ‘breach of the peace,’ a
category she claims was then understood narrowly as covering only those
nonfelony offenses ‘involving or tending toward violence.’”347 Justice
Souter observed that
Atwater has cited no particular evidence that those who framed
and ratified the Fourth Amendment sought to limit peace officers’
warrantless misdemeanor arrest authority to instances of actual
breach of the peace, and our own review of the recent and

338

Id. at 323–24.
Id. at 324 n.1.
340 Id. at 324.
341 Id.
342 Id.
343 Id.
344 Id. at 325.
345 Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 165 F.3d 380, 387–88 (5th Cir.), vacated, 171 F.3d
258 (5th Cir.), and reinstated in part on reh’g en banc, 195 F.3d 242 (5th Cir. 1999), aff’d,
532 U.S. 318 (2001).
346 Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 195 F.3d 242, 246 (5th Cir. 1999) (en banc), aff’d,
532 U.S. 318 (2001).
347 Atwater, 532 U.S. at 326–27 (citation omitted).
339
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respected compilations of framing-era documentary history has
likewise failed to reveal any such design.348
Justice Souter recognized that, on the facts, the arrest of Atwater
appeared unreasonable and somewhat vindictive:
If we were to derive a rule exclusively to address the
uncontested facts of this case, Atwater might well prevail. She
was a known and established resident of Lago Vista with no place
to hide and no incentive to flee, and common sense says she
would almost certainly have buckled up as a condition of driving
off with a citation. In her case, the physical incidents of arrest
were merely gratuitous humiliations imposed by a police officer
who was (at best) exercising extremely poor judgment.349
But Justice Souter then reasoned that any standard other than one
permitting officers to arrest everyone at their discretion was unworkable:
One line . . . might be between ‘jailable’ and ‘fine-only’
offenses, between those for which conviction could result in
commitment and those for which it could not. The trouble with
this distinction, of course, is that an officer on the street might not
be able to tell. It is not merely that we cannot expect every police
officer to know the details of frequently complex penalty
schemes, . . . but that penalties for ostensibly identical conduct can
vary on account of facts difficult (if not impossible) to know at the
scene of an arrest. Is this the first offense or is the suspect a repeat
offender? Is the weight of the marijuana a gram above or a gram
below the fine-only line? Where conduct could implicate more
than one criminal prohibition, which one will the district attorney
ultimately decide to charge? And so on.350
Despite this analysis, Justice Souter was able to come up with one
simple rule, but ultimately rejected it:
One may ask, of course, why these difficulties may not be
answered by a simple tie breaker for the police to follow in the
field: if in doubt, do not arrest. The first answer is that in practice
the tie breaker would boil down to something akin to a leastrestrictive-alternative limitation, which is itself one of those “ifs,
ands, and buts” rules, generally thought inappropriate in working
out Fourth Amendment protection. . . . Beyond that, whatever
help the tie breaker might give would come at the price of a
systematic disincentive to arrest in situations where even Atwater
concedes that arresting would serve an important societal interest.
348
349
350

Id. at 336.
Id. at 346–47.
Id. at 348–49 (footnotes omitted).
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An officer not quite sure that the drugs weighed enough to warrant
jail time or not quite certain about a suspect’s risk of flight would
not arrest, even though it could perfectly well turn out that, in fact,
the offense called for incarceration and the defendant was long
gone on the day of trial. Multiplied many times over, the costs to
society of such underenforcement could easily outweigh the costs
to defendants of being needlessly arrested and booked, as Atwater
herself acknowledges.351
Justice Souter’s concern about Atwater’s particular facts was
somewhat assuaged by his belief that there was “a dearth of horribles
demanding redress.”352 This was evidenced by the fact that “when
Atwater’s counsel was asked at oral argument for any indications of
comparably foolish, warrantless misdemeanor arrests, he could offer only
one.”353
Justice Souter clearly minimized the importance of the personal and
emotional consequences of being arrested:
Atwater’s arrest was surely “humiliating,” as she says in her brief,
but it was no more “harmful to . . . privacy or . . . physical
interests” than the normal custodial arrest. She was handcuffed,
placed in a squad car, and taken to the local police station, where
officers asked her to remove her shoes, jewelry, and glasses, and
to empty her pockets. They then took her photograph and placed
her in a cell, alone, for about an hour, after which she was taken
before a magistrate, and released on $310 bond. The arrest and
booking were inconvenient and embarrassing to Atwater, but not
so extraordinary as to violate the Fourth Amendment.354
As lawyers and family members who visit persons who have been arrested
are quick to realize, to say that a particular arrest was “no more harmful to
privacy or physical interests” than the normal arrest is to ignore the harm
that often occurs from such arrests. Not everyone is kept alone in a cell,
and not everyone gets out in an hour. Fear of physical and sexual assault is
often real and sadly warranted. The notion that because all custodial arrests
are potentially dangerous, we should not worry about any of them reflects a
failure to appreciate what it is like to be arrested.
Justice Souter completely failed to offer any genuine reason why
arrests are needed in a host of cases. His argument that lines may be
difficult to draw ultimately is unpersuasive. His “ifs, ands, and buts”
analysis came from Belton,355 and we have seen that the problem with
351
352
353
354
355

Id. at 350–51 (citation omitted).
Id. at 353.
Id.
Id. at 354–55.
Id. at 350 (citing New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981)).
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Belton is simply that it is unprincipled.356
Furthermore, Justice Souter’s opinion seemed to assume that if the
Court announced a principle—e.g., that an arrest may only be made where
an individual poses a danger to society or is at risk of not appearing in court
if a summons or citation is issued357—police officers would be unable to
enforce such a rule. There is, however, every reason to think otherwise.
Legislatures could act to identify dangerous offenses for which arrests are
always deemed proper, and courts could give appropriate deference to such
judgments. Moreover, officers now make these judgments, but they do so
without any constitutional principle to guide them—i.e., every time police
officers have authority to decide whether to arrest or issue a summons, they
make the very judgment that Justice Souter concludes they cannot make.
In effect, the Atwater Court sanctioned arrests made with questionable
motives. For the majority, it was acceptable for an officer to make an
arrest of a person whom the officer knows could only be fined, thereby
punishing the person with imprisonment. It was also permissible to arrest a
person solely for the purpose of making an otherwise impermissible search
incident to arrest,358 or to assure an opportunity for custodial interrogation
that would not otherwise exist. As noted earlier, the Court ought to forbid
these purposes, and limiting the number of arrests is the only way to
accomplish this.
Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined Justice O’Connor’s
dissent.359 Justice O’Connor identified the harms associated with arrest
more clearly than did Justice Souter,360 and she limited her preferred rule to
fine-only offenses:
In light of the availability of citations to promote a State’s
interests when a fine-only offense has been committed, I cannot
concur in a rule which deems a full custodial arrest to be
356

See supra text accompanying notes 197–200.
This is the standard used in Canada. Under the Canada Criminal Code, a police
officer has the obligation to not arrest a person if he or she believes on reasonable grounds
that the public interest may be satisfied without arresting the person and there are no
reasonable grounds to believe that the person will fail to show up in court. Canada Criminal
Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 495(2) (1985). Indeed, even in terrorism cases, arrest without
warrant is the exception rather than the rule. Canadian law allows a peace officer to arrest
without a warrant under exceptional circumstances when it is believed a terrorist act is about
to occur, and it is impractical to obtain the necessary warrant in time. Anti-Terrorism Act,
2001 S.C., ch. 41, § 83.3(4) (Can.). This warrantless arrest provision is subject to an annual
reporting requirement, and the authority to make warrantless arrests expires in early 2007,
unless an extension is passed by both Houses of Parliament. CANADIAN ANNUAL REPORT
ON THE USE OF ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT PURSUANT TO THE ANTI-TERRORISM ACT 5
(2002), http://ww2.psepc.gc.ca/publications/national_security/pdf/ARC36_2002_e.pdf.
358 Justice O’Connor’s dissenting opinion specifically recognizes this motivation on
the part of officers. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 372 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
359 See id. at 360.
360 See id. at 364–65.
357
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reasonable in every circumstance.
Giving police officers
constitutional carte blanche to effect an arrest whenever there is
probable cause to believe a fine-only misdemeanor has been
committed is irreconcilable with the Fourth Amendment’s
command that seizures be reasonable. Instead, I would require
that when there is probable cause to believe that a fine-only
offense has been committed, the police officer should issue a
citation unless the officer is “able to point to specific and
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences
from those facts, reasonably warrant [the additional] intrusion” of
a full custodial arrest.361
Justice O’Connor also argued that the doctrine of qualified immunity
would protect officers from liability for making reasonable judgments at
the time of arrest that a court later deemed wrong.362 Qualified immunity
would thus assure that there were no undue disincentives to arresting those
for whom a legitimate reason existed to arrest.363
Law enforcement officers are called upon to make judgments all the
time. They must decide whether they have reasonable suspicion or
probable cause, and whether an exigency exists that justifies a search
without a warrant. The rule is that courts will not condemn a judgment of
an officer as long as it is reasonable. The court need not agree with the
officer; it is sufficient that the court finds that the officer acted within the
ballpark of reasonableness.
The Atwater Court could have built upon this deference to police and
simultaneously imposed a principled limit on the power to arrest. It could
have held that officers may arrest when they have a reasonable basis to
conclude that a suspect poses a risk to the community or a risk of
nonappearance. It could have added that violent acts presumptively
involve risk to the community; that drug offenses, because of the potential
penalties involved, presumptively pose a risk of flight; and that courts
should give deference to legislative judgments mandating arrests under
certain circumstances. Finally, the Court could have clearly stated that an
officer who is deciding whether or not to make an arrest may check for
outstanding warrants before deciding to issue a citation in order to assure
that dangerous individuals are not inadvertently released. There was no
need to limit restrictions on arrest to fine-only situations, as Justice
O’Connor’s dissent would have done. The limit could easily have
extended to all minor offenses and offenders where there is no apparent
danger or likelihood of flight.
Instead, the Court permitted law
enforcement officers to continue to act arbitrarily, punitively, and
361
362
363

Id. at 365–66 (citation omitted).
Id. at 367–68.
Id.
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unnecessarily—to engage in totally unprincipled behavior. The alternative
was to adopt a principle and trust law enforcement to apply it reasonably.
Similarly, when arrest warrants are sought, there is no reason why
magistrates should not be required to decide whether an arrest is
appropriate or whether a summons would suffice. Rules like Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 4(a), which permits a prosecutor to compel the
issuance of an arrest warrant whenever there is probable cause, are
overbroad. The prosecutor ought to have to state reasons why he believes
an arrest is required. Because it is the magistrates who determine whether
to release arrestees and on what conditions, they surely have the capacity to
determine whether people should be arrested in the first place.364
In his majority opinion, Justice Souter relied on the failure of
Atwater’s counsel to cite more than one other case in which police conduct
was as offensive as in the Atwater case.365 His conclusion that there was a
“dearth of horribles”366 is surprising, if not amazing. After all, the Supreme
Court itself invited offensive conduct and placed its imprimatur on it in
Whren v. United States.367 In Whren, plainclothes officers of the District of
Columbia Metropolitan Police Department patrolled, in an unmarked car, a
“high drug area” and became suspicious of several youths occupying a
Pathfinder truck with temporary license plates waiting at a stop sign.368
The only suspicious act that the Court described, other than the
automobile’s presence in a “high drug area,” was that the driver was
looking down into the lap of the passenger at his right while remaining
stopped at the stop sign for more than twenty seconds.369 When the police
car turned around to head back toward the truck, the truck turned suddenly,
without signaling, and drove away at an “unreasonable” speed.370 The
police pursued and were able to approach the Pathfinder when it stopped at
a red light.371
District of Columbia police regulations prohibited the officers from
enforcing traffic laws generally.372 Plainclothes officers were permitted to
enforce traffic laws “only in the case of a violation that is so grave as to
pose an immediate threat to the safety of others.”373 It was clear, therefore,
364 There may be more information available about a suspect when a release decision is
made than when a warrant is sought. If it were known, however, that the magistrate would
decide whether an arrest should occur, information about the suspect might well be made
available to the magistrate when prosecutors or the police seek the arrest warrant.
365 Atwater, 532 U.S. at 353.
366 Id.
367 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 816–19 (1996).
368 Id. at 808.
369 Id.
370 Id.
371 Id.
372 Id. at 815.
373 Id. (quotation omitted).
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that the officers in Whren were not entrusted with responsibility for
ordinary driving infractions; they were generally prohibited from policing
such infractions. Nevertheless, the officers concluded that they had
probable cause to arrest the driver of the car for making a turn without
signaling properly and for driving at an unreasonable speed (which
presumably is not the same as exceeding the speed limit).374 A unanimous
Court in Whren rejected the argument that the stop was a pretext and that
an officer’s subjective intent should govern rather than an objective
assessment of reasonableness.375
Whren did not specifically address the question finally reached in
Atwater, but it certainly foreshadowed the Atwater decision. Justice Scalia
wrote for the unanimous Court:
Petitioners urge as an extraordinary factor in this case that the
“multitude of applicable traffic and equipment regulations” is so
large and so difficult to obey perfectly that virtually everyone is
guilty of violation, permitting the police to single out almost
whomever they wish for a stop. But we are aware of no principle
that would allow us to decide at what point a code of law becomes
so expansive and so commonly violated that infraction itself can
no longer be the ordinary measure of the lawfulness of
enforcement. And even if we could identify such exorbitant
codes, we do not know by what standard (or what right) we would
decide, as petitioners would have us do, which particular
provisions are sufficiently important to merit enforcement.376
This may have been dictum, but it also was a strong statement that the
Court was not going to distinguish between types of offenses in assessing
the legitimacy of police practices.
Even if the Whren Court was correct in holding that police conduct
should be viewed by an objective standard, a reasonable objective standard
could place limits on the right to arrest. In Whren, the police saw drugs as
they approached the car.377 Thus, they did not have to arrest for the traffic
violations in order to justify a search of the car. But Atwater and Whren
clearly empower police departments to direct officers who see any traffic
violation for which an arrest can be made, no matter how minor, to arrest
the driver for the specific purpose of searching the car, even though the
officer lacks reasonable suspicion that the car contains contraband or
evidence of a crime. That is what the officers were prepared to do in
Whren. That is what officers do throughout the country now that they have
been given permission by the Supreme Court.
374
375
376
377

Id. at 809.
Id. at 813.
Id. at 818–19.
Id. at 808–09.
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The reason that Justice Souter found a “dearth of horribles” is that,
although the Court expressed concern for the specific treatment of Gail
Atwater, it has demonstrated indifference to the use of the power to arrest
in other settings. For more than thirty years, it has empowered the police to
arrest for minor offenses and to subsequently search incident to an arrest.378
Now it has made clear that there is no offense so minor that arrest is a
constitutionally impermissible response to a violation.
Whren might well be a sound decision, but it greatly increased the
need for the Supreme Court to impose a limit on the power to arrest. The
problem is not that law enforcement officers use the power given to them.
The problem is that the power to arrest ought to be subject to the
reasonableness restriction of the Fourth Amendment.
3. The Warrant Requirement
a. The Basic Rule
Despite the Supreme Court’s assumption that warrantless searches and
seizures are presumptively bad, the most common warrantless police
activity is a warrantless arrest. In many, if not most instances, warrantless
arrests are easily justified because exigent circumstances exist. When law
enforcement officers encounter people who are engaged in criminal
activity, about to engage in such activity, or are fleeing the scene of such
activity, it would make little sense to require police to get warrants to
apprehend these individuals. The question is not whether the police should
act; society demands that they act. The question is whether the police
should arrest.
Even though the vast bulk of arrests occur as police react to events
they could not fully anticipate, there are situations in which investigations
occur over time, law enforcement officers identify suspects well in advance
of arrest, there is sufficient time to obtain a warrant for arrest, and there is
no appreciable danger of destruction of evidence or escape while a warrant
is sought. Even in these cases, as a result of its decision in United States v.
Watson,379 the Supreme Court does not require a warrant.380 Ironically, like
New York v. Belton,381 Watson invoked a doctrine that was unnecessary to
decide the case.
In Watson, Khoury, an informant, told a postal inspector that Watson
possessed a stolen credit card, and later delivered the card to the

378

See, e.g., Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 266 (1973) (holding that the arrest
and subsequent search of a driver for not having his driver’s license was constitutionally
permissible).
379 United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
380 Id. at 423–24.
381 See supra text accompanying notes 186–200.
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inspector.382 Khoury had been a reliable informant in the past, and his tip
could have supported an arrest warrant.383 The inspector, however, learned
that Watson had agreed to supply additional cards and wanted to gather all
possible evidence regarding Watson’s illegal activity.384 Khoury agreed to
cooperate and arranged to meet with Watson.385 The two met in a
restaurant, where Khoury signaled to officers that Watson had the cards
with him; the officers closed in and arrested Watson.386 A search incident
to the arrest revealed that he had no stolen cards, but after Watson agreed to
a search of his car, officers found two more stolen cards under a floor
mat.387
The officers had probable cause to arrest Watson as a result of
Khoury’s past track record, tip in the case, and signal.388 Had Khoury not
given the signal, an arrest probably would not have been made. When the
officers got the signal, they judged that they had probable cause.389 They
were not about to let Watson leave with the stolen cards, and thus the
warrantless arrest was a typical arrest made for a crime in progress.390
Despite the fact that the warrantless arrest was justifiable as an
exigent-circumstance arrest, Justice White’s opinion for the Court
addressed the general question of whether an arrest for a felony may be
made without a warrant regardless of the circumstances.391 He concluded
that it could.392 His majority opinion and Justice Marshall’s dissent dueled
over the meaning of the history of warrantless arrests.393 The majority and
the dissent agreed on the common law rule: “[A] peace officer was
permitted to arrest without a warrant for a misdemeanor or felony
committed in his presence as well as for a felony not committed in his
presence if there was reasonable ground for making the arrest.”394 The
disagreement came over how to phrase the question. For the majority, the
question was whether warrantless felony arrests were historically

382

Watson, 423 U.S. at 412–13.
Id. at 412.
384 Id. at 413.
385 Id.
386 Id.
387 Id.
388 Id. at 434–35 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
389 Id. at 434.
390 Id. at 435.
391 Id. at 416–17 (majority opinion). Justice Powell’s concurring opinion argued that
“the case could be disposed of on the ground that respondent’s consent to the search was
plainly voluntary.” Id. at 425 (Powell, J., concurring). This is questionable. If the arrest
had been invalid, the consent might have been tainted.
392 Id. at 423–24 (majority opinion).
393 Compare id. at 418–23, with id. at 438–42 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
394 Id. at 418 (majority opinion); id. at 438 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
383
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permitted.395 For the dissent, the question was whether warrantless arrests
for crimes that today are classified as felonies were historically
permitted.396 The answer by the majority to its question was “yes,” and the
dissent did not quarrel with that.397 The answer to the dissent’s question
was “no,” and the majority did not quarrel with that.398
The Court might have discussed why the common-law rule permitted
warrantless arrests, but it did not. Had it done so, it would have recognized
that at common law, “[n]o crime was considered a felony which did not
occasion a total forfeiture of the offender’s lands, or goods, or both,” and
therefore the term “felony” was limited to a few of the most serious
crimes.399 A suspect had substantial reason to flee, police forces of the type
that now exist throughout the United States did not exist then, and
immediately apprehending the most dangerous suspects when they were
found was thought to be reasonable. Given the number of felonies set forth
in modern criminal codes and the range of penalties, the need to arrest all
suspects in felony cases without warrants is not as apparent as it was at
common law. Moreover, the Court’s preference for warrants was not
firmed up until decisions like Chimel,400 which preceded Watson by only a
few years.
Justice Powell’s concurring opinion in Watson was the only opinion to
address whether there is any good reason to excuse not obtaining a warrant
when no exigent circumstances exist.401 He recognized that the Court’s
decisions created an anomaly, i.e., that people get less protection than
property:
Since the Fourth Amendment speaks equally to both searches
and seizures, and since an arrest, the taking hold of one’s person,
is quintessentially a seizure, it would seem that the constitutional
provision should impose the same limitations upon arrests that it
does upon searches. Indeed, as an abstract matter an argument
can be made that the restrictions upon arrest perhaps should be
greater. A search may cause only annoyance and temporary
inconvenience to the law-abiding citizen, assuming more serious
dimension only when it turns up evidence of criminality. An
arrest, however, is a serious personal intrusion regardless of
whether the person seized is guilty or innocent. Although an
arrestee cannot be held for a significant period without some

395
396
397
398
399
400
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Id. at 418–24 (majority opinion).
Id. at 438–40 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 418 (majority opinion).
Id. at 440 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 439 (quotation omitted).
See supra text accompanying notes 173–179.
Watson, 423 U.S. at 426 (Powell, J., concurring).
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neutral determination that there are grounds to do so, no decision
that he should go free can come quickly enough to erase the
invasion of his privacy that already will have occurred.402
Despite the power of this analysis, Justice Powell added that “logic
sometimes must defer to history and experience.”403 It would seem,
however, that logic should defer to history and experience only if those two
elements provide an adequate reason for deference.404 Justice Powell
offered only this:
Good police practice often requires postponing an arrest, even
after probable cause has been established, in order to place the
suspect under surveillance or otherwise develop further evidence
necessary to prove guilt to a jury. Under the holding of the Court
of Appeals such additional investigative work could imperil the
entire prosecution. Should the officers fail to obtain a warrant
initially, and later be required by unforeseen circumstances to
arrest immediately with no chance to procure a last-minute
warrant, they would risk a court decision that the subsequent
exigency did not excuse their failure to get a warrant in the interim
since they first developed probable cause. If the officers
attempted to meet such a contingency by procuring a warrant as
soon as they had probable cause and then merely held it during
their subsequent investigation, they would risk a court decision
that the warrant had grown stale by the time it was used.405
This reasoning is flawed. If law enforcement officers have probable
cause to believe that a suspect committed a crime for which an arrest is
warranted, and there are no exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless
arrest, then there is no reason that they should not obtain an arrest warrant.
If they are involved in an investigation that makes it impractical to obtain a
warrant, because they would have to leave the investigation scene, exigent
402

Id. at 428 (citation omitted).
Id. at 429.
404 Justice Powell opined that “the prior decisions of the Court have assumed the
validity of such [warrantless] arrests without addressing in a reasoned way the analysis
advanced by respondent.” Id. at 426. He attempted to provide some reason why warrantless
arrests absent exigent circumstances made sense.
In Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), the Court rejected both history and
experience as it held that the common law rule that law enforcement officers could use
deadly force to prevent a felon from fleeing was invalid under the Fourth Amendment. Id.
at 3. Justice White, the author of the Court’s opinion in Watson, also wrote the majority
opinion in Garner and reasoned that “[b]ecause of sweeping change in the legal and
technological context, reliance on the common-law rule in this case would be a mistaken
literalism that ignores the purposes of a historical inquiry.” Id. at 13. This is akin to the
argument made by the dissenters in Watson. See Watson, 423 U.S. at 439–42 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
405 Watson, 423 U.S. at 431–32 (Powell, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
403
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circumstances would exist to excuse the warrant requirement. Once a
warrant is obtained, it is the rarest of cases in which probable cause
disappears. Indeed, it is difficult to understand how the facts leading to
probable cause could ever become stale. Officers might learn that there is
an innocent and true explanation for facts that seemed damning when a
warrant was obtained. In such a case, they ought to seek withdrawal of the
warrant. But unlike search warrants, which can become stale because
property may be moved or disposed of, arrest warrants, once issued, will
remain valid virtually forever.
Moreover, officers still have the option of continuing the investigation
of a suspect, even though they already have probable cause to arrest him, in
the hope of discovering additional crimes or criminals; if they are
successful, as the police were in Watson, they will be permitted to arrest the
suspect(s) without a warrant for the additional crimes. In short, none of
Justice Powell’s concerns support the distinction between warrants for
searches of property and warrantless arrests of individuals.
b. The Twists on the Basic Rule
After deciding Watson, the Court developed a series of confusing rules
for arrests in the home. In Payton v. New York,406 the Court held that,
absent exigent circumstances, police may not enter a suspect’s home to
arrest the suspect without an arrest warrant or a search warrant.407 Police
with a search warrant may enter at any time to search the premises. Police
with an arrest warrant may only enter “when there is reason to believe the
suspect is within.”408 Payton thus placed the burden on lower courts to
decide whether arrests take place within the home or without.409
After Payton, the Court held in Steagald v. United States410 that absent
exigent circumstances, a search warrant rather than an arrest warrant was
required to enter the home of a third party to arrest a suspect inside the
home.411 The Court was concerned that, absent a search warrant
requirement, “[a]rmed solely with an arrest warrant for a single person, the
police could search all the homes of that individual’s friends and
acquaintances.”412 Payton and Steagald required the police to know

406

Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
Id. at 576.
408 Id. at 603.
409 See, e.g., United States v. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d 1423, 1427 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding
that no arrest warrant was required where the defendant voluntarily opened his door and
thus “exposed himself in a public place”); United States v. Holland, 755 F.2d 253, 257 (2d
Cir. 1985) (holding in a two-to-one decision that an arrest in the entranceway to a common
hallway outside of a home did not take place inside the home).
410 Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981).
411 Id. at 205–06.
412 Id. at 215.
407
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exactly whose house they were entering to make an arrest. If it was the
suspect’s own house (or one shared by the suspect with others), an arrest
warrant was sufficient. If it was a third party’s house, a search warrant was
required.
What if the suspect were temporarily sharing a house? The answer to
that question came in Minnesota v. Olson,413 where the Court held that an
arrest warrant was required under Payton to arrest an overnight guest in the
home of a third person.414 The State argued that no warrant was needed to
arrest Olson because an overnight guest has no reasonable expectation of
privacy in the guest home—the Court flatly rejected this argument.415
Although the Court rejected the State’s argument that no warrant was
required, it failed to explain why a search warrant was not required to enter
the home to arrest Olson, as Steagald would seem to require.416 The
answer almost certainly is that Olson, although a temporary guest, was not
the intended beneficiary of the Steagald rule. Steagald protects the owner
of the home, not the guest.417 If the police enter a third party’s home
without a search warrant, the owner can complain, but the temporary guest
cannot. If, however, the temporary guest is treated as though he has a
protected interest in the home, as Olson was treated, the temporary guest
can object to entry without the arrest warrant required by Payton.418
What if a person is not an overnight guest, but is visiting and taking an
afternoon nap? Is an arrest warrant required to enter the house? How
could the police know whether or not the person was napping, or how long
the person intended to stay? How could the police know that a suspect had
stayed overnight or was planning to stay for the night? The reality is that
the police generally have no way of knowing how long a suspect is going
to stay in a particular place.
The Court confirmed its reasonable expectation of privacy rule set
down in Olson in its decision in Minnesota v. Carter.419 The Court in
Carter held that two men who were cutting up cocaine in an apartment had
no standing to object to a warrantless search because they had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises.420
These decisions must be confusing to police. They have to know what
a suspect’s relationship is to a house in order to know whether a warrant is
required, and if so, what kind of warrant is required to enter in order to
make an arrest without violating someone’s constitutional rights. It is often
413
414
415
416
417
418
419
420

Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990).
Id. at 100.
Id. at 96–97.
See Steagald, 451 U.S. at 205–06.
See id. at 215.
Olson, 495 U.S. at 96–97.
Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998).
Id. at 91.
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difficult for the police simply to locate a suspect. When they finally do,
determining what role the suspect is playing vis-à-vis a particular premises
may be quite burdensome.
c. A Better Way
The underlying problem that gives rise to these confusing holdings is
that the power to arrest is not limited to suspects who pose a danger to
society. If it were so limited, a strong case could be made that in order to
make an arrest, with or without a warrant, officers should be able to enter a
home when they have probable cause that the suspect is inside. If arrests
were confined to persons who posed a danger to the community or of
flight, there is a strong case to be made that exigent circumstances exist to
arrest those persons immediately.
There is a trade-off: fewer people would be arrested if the Court
limited the power to arrest for minor crimes, but more people would be
arrested in their homes without warrants if the Court viewed the discovery
of those subject to arrest as a per se exigent circumstance justifying
immediate action.
D.

Searches

The Supreme Court could make Fourth Amendment rules regarding
searches much simpler if it adopted three straightforward principles:
1. Chimel governs searches incident to arrest in all settings, and
Belton is no longer good law.421
2. Law enforcement officers who want to search property
generally must obtain a warrant.
3. If, however, exigent circumstances exist such that property may
be destroyed, cause damage, or disappear while a warrant is
sought, officers may seize, detain, or restrain the property while a
warrant is sought or may conduct an immediate search if it is not
practicable to obtain a warrant, but must seek a warrant to
continue a search once the exigency disappears.
These three principles would give the Warrant Clause the deference
the Court said it deserves, guide law enforcement officers by providing
principles for action, and obviate the need for arbitrary rules like the
automobile exception and Belton. These principles are consistent with
decisions the Court has made regarding murder scenes,422 fire scenes,423
421

See supra text accompanying notes 173–179; supra text accompanying notes 186–

201.
422 See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978) (holding that a warrantless search
must be circumscribed by exigency, and that when the emergency subsides, a warrant
should be sought).
423 See Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 293 (1984) (holding that a warrantless
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and drug scenes.424 These principles would provide guidance to govern the
basic enforcement of criminal law. They would not necessarily control the
myriad of other government activities that are covered by the Fourth
Amendment.
One additional principle would also be helpful. This principle would
recognize that when police conduct health and safety inspections to enforce
various administrative schemes, a warrant should be required to search
individuals or places unless there is consent to search. There is no reason
for the Court to continue to vacillate on the issue of whether a warrant is
required for administrative searches.425 Assuming the government has a
reasonable health and safety plan, an administrative judge or other judge
should be required to approve the plan and issue warrants implementing the
plan. The warrants could be sought in advance of any searches, so surprise
would still be possible if it was an important part of the government
scheme. Furthermore, if the Court treated drug testing as a health and
safety search, it could avoid the arbitrariness of the “special needs” cases
and bring drug testing into the mainstream of administrative searches.426
In short, implementing this set of principles would help the Court to
avoid continuing to develop a broad and confusing landscape of
unprincipled bright line rules and exceptions thereto regarding searches.
Such a principled approach would greatly assist law enforcement officers
to do their jobs better and would ensure that dangerous criminals are not
freed on technicalities that result from misinterpretations of these complex
and arbitrary rules.
Conclusion
The arbitrariness of the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment cases did
entry into a home was limited to exigent circumstances immediately after fire).
424 See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 328 (2001) (holding that police with
probable cause to believe that a suspect had drugs in his home could prevent the suspect
from entering for two hours while they obtained a search warrant).
425 See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 699–701 (1987), and cases cited therein.
426 See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002) (drug testing of students
participating in extracurricular activities); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646
(1995) (drug testing of student athletes); Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489
U.S. 656 (1989) (drug testing of Customs Service employees). The warrants, like those the
Court spoke favorably of in Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967) and See v.
City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545 (1967), need not be based on probable cause regarding
particular individuals. The question would be whether the proposed search is in compliance
with a reasonable administrative scheme. One could imagine a drug-testing scheme that
resulted in warrants that described a group of individuals to be tested according to
designated criteria rather than by name. This type of scheme could also be applied to testing
programs like that reviewed in Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
Although it might well be impossible prior to train accidents to name individuals who would
be involved in the accidents, a description of the individuals who could be tested following
an accident could be developed and a warrant issued for the group.
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not begin with the Rehnquist Court. Doctrines like the automobile
exception have deep roots in the decisions of earlier Courts. But the
Rehnquist Court, like its predecessors, tended to adopt bright line rules that
were neither needed by law enforcement nor likely to make it easier for law
enforcement to deal with changing facts.
Law enforcement officers benefit more from an understanding of the
principles that are derived from the Fourth Amendment than from arbitrary,
bright line rules. Once they understand principles, they can apply those
principles to changing facts.
I have sought to demonstrate how inconsistent and unpersuasive the
Court’s decisions have been over many years in a number of Fourth
Amendment settings, and to suggest principles which, if adopted, would
simplify the law, make it more understandable, and better protect both
people and property.
The Rehnquist Court was satisfied with the rules it inherited, and
generally built upon them. The end result of having more decisions piled
on those that came before is that Fourth Amendment law resembles the
Internal Revenue Code in its complexity. It need not. A principled
approach to the Fourth Amendment remains an option.

